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Problem.-The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a comprehensive
study of the extent, causes, and effects involved in the development of
the synthetic rubber industry in the United States for the years from I9U0
to 1957.
Scope .-This study is concerned first mth vihat caused the government
to undertake such a gigantic synthetic program in World War II, and to
continue its participation in this industry for fifteen yearsj -nhich con¬
sequently built in this country a con5>letely new industry, and for the
natural rubber producer abroad a threatening competitor. Secondly, a
brief but thorou^ review of each stage of the development is performed.
Lastly, we wish to determine what changes, emanating from this development,
occured in both internal and external rubber markets; and frran an economic
an^e, to evaluate the government l5*^ar participations.
Significance.-The creation of an American synthetic rubber industry
by the government in the World War H has altered the permanent nature of
the rubber industry. This work should at least show how and what alter¬
ations took place in the short history of growth of the synthetic rubber
industry, for
Industries are the product of an evolutionaiy past which has shaped
their present structure and practices...A study of the history of the
industry and the circumstances surrounding its early development ex¬
plains much of its present structure and makes that structure appear
more logical and economically justifiable.,,.^
Besides, it should provide useful information for those who interested in
B. Alderfer and H, E, Michl, Economics of American Industry (New
lork, 1957), p. 12.
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further study of the rubber industry and related fields.
Definitions .^Synthetic rubber” in this study is defined as: "an
elastomer—a rubberlike material that -will stretch 150 per cent or more
and return idth force to approximately its original shape and position."^
that is, "any product of chemical synthesis similar in general properties
and applications to natural rubber, and specifically capable of vulcani¬
zation,"^ Honrever, reclaimed synthetic rubber is not included. There¬
fore, the "synthetic rubber industry" means a homogeneous grovip of enter¬
prises or co!i5>anies idiich produce the defined material,
"Natural rubber" means "all forms and types of tree, vine, or shrub
rubber, including guayule and natural rubber latex, but excluding reclaimed
natural rubber,
"(H-S (or S-type, or SBR-type), general-purpose synthetic rubber"
means a synthetic rubber of the butadiene-styrene type produced in the
United States generally suitable for use in the manufacture of transpOT-
tation items such as tires or camelback, not including reclaimed general-
purpose synthetic rubber. It is made by joining two chemicals (butadiene
and styrene) throu^ a process known as copolymerization. Butadiene, in
turn, is made from either petroleum or alcohol, while styrene is made from
benzene and ethylene,
"Special-purpose synthetic rubber" means a synthetic rubber of the
type knoTO as butyl (CR-I), neoprene, or N-types (butadiene-acrylonitrile
^Ibid,, p, 317.
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Procedtire,~The beginning chapter of this study attempts to detennine
the primary and immediate cause of the development of the synthetic rubber
industry in this country* To achieve this aim, each possible factor is to
be examined carefully and critically. The main body of the text describes
chronologically the groTwth of this industry, with emphasis on government
participations* The conclusions of this study are reached throu^ statisti¬
cal methods* The trend of physical quantity of output is used as a sin^e
measurement of the development, for
One aspect of the development of an industry is concerned with its
growth* The problem of measuring the growth of an industry is as
difficult as that encountered in measuring size and scale* There
are several yardsticks, and each has its limitations,*•*
The best sin^e test of grourth and decline is found in -Uie trend of
physical quantity of output,,**^
The evaluation of the government programs and projects is achieved using
the writer's personal judgement and other authors' critical analysis.
Materials * -Since no other work similar to this has been published,
except for related materials which been appeared as parts of various books
and government publications, the data of this study are the result of a
conqpilation of these references. Generally, there are four sources of
Information, namely: (1) government publications: various reports,
hearings, and statistics regarding synthetic rubber are relied on as a
basic and authoritative source of facts; (2) periodicals: the monthly
magazine. Rubber World (former India Rubber World), served as a general
guide to both public and private activities and opinions, and is refered
extensively for the period from October, 19U0 to March, 1957 excluding the
^Alderfer and Michl, op, clt,, pp* 12-13*
u
six months from April to September of 19U9 Tnhen the volume for these months
was missing and therefore unavailable at the public library; (3) books of
economics of American industry: Mr. Adams and Mr. Cray's Monopoly in Ameri¬
ca. Mr* Alderfer and Prof. Michl's Economics of American Industry. Profes¬
sors GLover and Cornell's The Development of American Industry, and Dr.
Bauer's The Rubber Industry, are main references and quoted constantly; and
(U) books of the history of wartime industries: Mr. Popple's Standard Oil
Company (New Jersey) in World War H. Mr. Walton's Miracle of World War II.
and Mr. Lief's The Firestone Story, are the others of this kind.
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACmOUND
Strategic significance of rubber to the United States*-The United
States is a motorized country,^ its dependence on rubber tires is obvious.
For more than tyro decades prior to World War II, this country imported and
consumed each year over half of the yrorld production of crude rubber (see
Table I)j the yearly average consim5)tion of rubber for 1935 to 1939 was
527,800 long tons about 5 times -what the next largest consumer. United
Kingdom, used.^
Approximately three fourths of all the crude rubber consumed in the
United States goes into tires and tubes. Mechanical goods, footwear
and clothing, shock-cushioning and electrical insulation materials
represent, in the order named, the more in^jortant other uses. These
products indicate the range of rubber’s services to modern civiliza¬
tion. The vast consumption of rubber in the ordinary course of civil
life makes the organization of rubber si:5)ply a matter of national con¬
cern.^
In I9U0, a year before the Pearl Harbor attack, there were 27-million ci¬
vilian passenger cars and nearly 6-million other types of motor-vehicles
(including trucks, tractor larucks, publicly owned vehicles, trailers, mo¬
tor cycles, etc.) on the roads. From the military an^e, no nation can
hope to survive in war without rubber tires and tubes to equip its motor
vehicles and airplanes. One author described this, said:
^In 1955, over 92 per cent (about 610,000-million passengernnlles)
of domestic intercity passenger traffic was carried by rubber-tired motor
vehicles (including commercial motor carriers and private automobiles).
Vide: United States Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States, (Washington, 1957), pp. 553 and 56o, tables 692 and 700.
^Vide Harry Jiler (ed.). Commodity Yearbook of 1955 (New York, 1955),
pp. 287-88.
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George W. Stocking and Ifyron W. Watkins, Cartels in Action (New
York, I9U6), p. 63.
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*•.Because of the increasing emphasis on mobility, combat vehicles
of all types use rubber tires# Artillery and self-propelled guns
are largely mounted on rubber-tired -nheels. In aircraft, rubber is
required for tires, de-icers, and self-sealing fuel tanks. Other
ingjortant military uses are in landing craft and tanks, life rafts,
pontoons, footwear, raincoats, and medical goods. Over,10 per cent
of the wei^t of the modern submarine is made of rubber#■*■
TABLE 1
lORLD NATUEIAL RUBBER PRODUCTION AND UNITED STATES IMPORTS,
I92I-I9UO*
(in Thousand Long Tons)
Year
World Production U, S. Imports Average^
Price
Total Far East^ 2Amount Share
1921 301 278 180 59.6 .165
1922. # # , , U06 380 296 72.9 .173
1923 U98 380 300 73.5 .307
I92U U26 39U 319 7U.9 .26U
1925 528 189 386 73.0 .730
1926 621 581 Uoo 6U.3 .U87
1927 606 562 hoh 66.5 .381
1928 653 622 U08 62.3 .226
1929 863 835 529 61.2 .206
1930, .... 821 802 U57 55.7 .119
1931 800 783 h76 59.5 .062
1932 708 699 39U 55.6 .035
1933 853 8U0 398 U6.7 .060
193U 1,019 1,005 U39 U3.1 .129
1935 873 853 U56 52.2 .12li
1936 857 832 ii76 55.U .165
1937 1,139 1,107 593 52.0 .19U
1938 89U 863 U06 U5.U .1U7
1939 1,00U 969 U87 U8.U .197
I9U0 1,389 l,3li8 811 58.U .202
Data compiled from U, S# Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract
of the United States (Washington, 1930-19i|l)#
^Plantation rubber,^After deduction of re-esports,
3Share of world production#
^Dollar per pound of plantation rubber (ribbed smoked sheet Ito# 1)#
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Doubtless, rubber is of strategic significance to both the civilian
and military economy of any nation, and especially to the United States,
•where more motor-vehicles and aircrafts are being used*
An erratic supply of natural rubber*-Had the rubber trees not required
a peculiar clima'te ("which is found only in so-called "Rubber Belt” areas)
for its gro"vdng5 and these trees not needed fi"VB "to six years before they
can become mature and be "tapped; and also, on the other hand, had the
Uni"ted S"ta"tes not needed to consumed so large amount of rubber each year;
there irould neve have been a "rubber crisis" as "well as the "synthetic
rubber re"volution" in this country during World War II*
As a mat"ber of fact, o"7er 95 per cent of "vrorld crude rubber used "to
come from the rubber plan"tations in the Far East; "while Malaya and Indo¬
nesia toge"ther contributed each year three-fourths of total world prodTiction*
(See Table 2*) Since "these two coxintries dominated "the rubber si?>ply
market, they really enjoyed a monopoly position in pushing for the hipest
price that their big buyer, American rubber manufacturers, would be able to
bear* Howe"ver, the latter had been pro"ved always able "to meet any price
"the rubber suppliers had fixed, because that:
^Ed'ward L* Allen, Economics of American Manufacturing (New York,
1952), pp* 185-5U.
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"These trees require hi^ humidity and heavy rainfall and a uniform
"temperature of about 90° during the day and lower than 70° during the night.
Climate of "this sort is found only between latitudes 30° south of the equa-
"tor, and this zone extending around the "world between these parallels is
known as the "Rubber Belt," The greatest amount of rubber used coramerciaL-
ly, however, comes from what is termed an "Inner Rubber Belt," "which ex¬
tends between latitudes 10° north and 10° sou"th of the equa"tor. This belt
includes the Amazon Valley in South America; Belgian Congo and Liberia in
Africa; Ceylon, Malayan Peninsula, Indo-China, the East Indies, and the
Philippine Islands in the Far East*" John G* Glo-ver and William B, Cornell,
^e pe"yelopment of American Industries (New York, 1951), pp* 51i5-U6* The’’East Indies'* lised! in this quo"bation is now the Republic of Indonesia,
8
Tires and tubes for the rapidly developing automobile industry
provided the major source of demand for rubber. In these uses rubber
has no substitute. Tires and tubes are only a minor part of the cost
of the motor vehicle, and the crude rubber required for their manu¬
facture, is a mTich smaller part. Even doubling the price of crude
rubber -would scarcely de-ter a prospect!-ve purchaser from buying an
au-tomobile, A rapidly gromng demand for automobiles made the demand
for rubber exceptionally insistent, and the price of rubber skyrocke-ted,"^
TABLE 2
WCHLD NATURAL RUBBER PRODUCTION,
1935-1955*







1935. . . m 725.0 57 .li 6.1 13.1
1936. , . 868 8U0.1 669.7 8.1; 18.9
1937. . . 1,207 1,172.1 951.8 n.U 22.0
1938. . . 909 875.9 676.7 12.1 20.2
1939. , . 1,001 96U.I; 738.3 11;.7 21.5
19U0, . , i,iau 1,370.1 1,090.1; 16.1 27.1
19l|lf . . • • 1,600 1,552.8 1,250.0 16.9 26.1;
19U2f . , 6U0 570.5 355.0 29.5 36.2
19l;3^ • • • • U65 377.U 175.0 Ul;.9 1;0.31910;^ . . • • 360 251.2 75.0 5U.8 1;8.9
19U5^ . . • • 250 lUU.9 18.6 5!;.3 1;6.1
19U6. . . 838 752.0 578.7 1;6.8 36.9
19U7. , . • • 1,269 1,182.U 92i;.2 38.5 3l;.8
19U8. . . 1,525 1,151.7 1,130.6 Ul.1; 21;.3
19h9. . . 1,U90 l,lil2.9 1,101;. 6 1;5.0 2l;.0
1950. . . • • 1,860 1,772.9 1,390.6 51;. 8 22.5
1951. . . 1,885 1,778.8 l,la9.8 72.0 25.1;
1952. . . • • 1,791 1,678.6 l,33l;.7 73.5 29.1;
1953. . . 1,725 1,611.2 1,269.0 76.7 27.1;
195U. . . 1,803 1,686.7 1,323.0 8U.5 21;.6
1955. . . 1,913 1,783.5 1,372.9 98.3 22.1
*Da-ta compiled from United Nations, S-tatistical Yearbook (Newr York.
1918^956).
Changed the unit from metric -tons in original data into present long
•tons by using a ratio of 0.98i4l96U2 metric ton to 1 long -ton,
^War period.
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Therefore, in facing an inelastic demand and a monopoly supply, the rubber
users in the United States found themselves entirely dependent iqpon the
foreign sellers' mercy* This hurt American pride. They began to feel
restless in such a dependent situation, the extremely erratic movements of
rubber price accentuated this feelingj and in turn, stimulated research
and experimentation on synthetic rubber as well as a search for other substi¬
tutes (e*g*: reclaimed rubber in this country, wild rubber in Latin America
and goayule in Mexico).
The price of natural rubber, during its brief history as a world com¬
modity, has experienced drastic fluctuations. Even in a normal year there
was a spread of as much as 75 per cent between hi^ and low, and in the
fourteen years before World War II prices ranged betiseen cents and $1.21
a pound. (Vide Table 3*) Some factors responsible for these curious
vacillations, besides the above mentioned monopoly sijpply and inelastic
demand, were the inelastic nature of rubber supply and the international
price controls. Since it takes a long time before newly planted trees
can bear rubber, any sizable increase in demand cannot be readily adjusted.
In addition, the rubber planters in IZalaya, who usually turn out nearly
half of the world rubber, have no alternative marketable products to export
and must depend thoroughly upon rubber selling. (Being contrary, the
rubber producers in Indonesia may have rice, pepper, coconut or spices to
bear additional income when price of rubber fallsj there are few of them
to concentrate in rubber planting as the Malayan doing.) "As a cash crop
it provides their livelihood,.,.for the most part live from hand to mouth,
price reductions may actually stimulate output, even at
^Stocking and Watkins, op. cit.. pp. 59-60*
10
TABLE 3
NEW YORK ANNIJAL HIGH, LOW AND AWRkGE SPOT RUBBER PRICES,
1910-19li0*
(Cents per Pound)
Year Hi^ Low Average Year Ki^ Low Average
1910. . . 288 II4I 206.60 1926| . .
1927f . .
88i ^ 36-3A I18.50
1911. . , 18U llU II4I.3O ia-3A 33 37.72
1912, . . lUo 198 121.60 1928^ . , ia| 17 22.U8
1913. . . 113 59 82.OU 1929. . . 26-7/8 20.55
19lU. . . 93 56 65.33 1930. . . 16|
^
11.98
1915. . . 79 584 65.58 1931. . . 8-5/8 6.17
1916. . . 102 55 72.50 1932. . . U-3/U 21
^
3.I16
1917. , . 90 52 72.23 1933. . . 9-7/8 2-7/8 5.96
1918. . . 70
■
Uo 60.15 193U^ . . 15-7/8 8-3A 12.92
1919. . . 57 38| U8.70 19355 . . 13-3/U io| 12.37
1920. . . 56J 16 36.30 19365 . . 23 13| i6.ia
1921. . . 2l| 111 16.36 19375 . . 26-7/8 Ih 19.39
1922^ . . 28-3/8 13-5/8 17.50 1938^ . . 17-3A6 10| 1U.6U









19hol3 . . 2h 18| 20.10
Data from John G, GELover and W, B* Cornell, The Development of Ameri¬
can Industries (New York, 1951), p« 5U9j Original source from Rubber A
based on Commodity Exchange data. Price for plantation rubber (ribbed
smoked sheets No, 1), ,
^Ist restriction program, °2nd restriction program,
the expense of the health of the trees, Therefore, an increase in demand
would bring only a hi^ price; but a decrease in demand would result in a
further decrease of price because more output would have to be turned out at
a sacrifice of the health of the trees in order to recover the same amount
of sales.
However, the major cause of the fluctuations of price is valorization,
a form of price control under governmental auspices. The first valoriza¬
tion program was the well-known Stevenson plan (1922-1928),^ Under this
^Ibid,, p, 63
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scheme, rubber prices moved from less than 20 cents a pound in 1922 to $1*20
a pound in 1925* The second one kno-vm as the International Rubber Regu¬
lation Committee (IRSC) from 193U to 19UUj controlled 98 per cent of the
total output of plantation rubber*^ These valorizations althou^ gaining
short-run market advantages and more favorable position of their foreign
exchange, were no doubt agents for the development and prosperity of their
rivals. Moreover, these restrictions resulted in u^y in^ressions in the
American public’s mind which later became one of the motivations for pro¬
tecting the American synthetic industry after World War IT,
Early history of synthetic rubber.-Although the commercial development
and mass production of synthetic rubber did not take place until the govern¬
ment took over the production of synthetic rubber in World War II, the
history of synthetic rubber is broaden than most people realize. The
abruptly appeaid-ng new industry had grown in the area of technology and
know-how for more than three decades before the War came in the 1^0's.
A brief description of this background is as follows;^
The first step of the development of synthetic rubber was the investi¬
gation of the chemical properties of natural rubber.
...As early as 1826, Michael Faraday, the En^ish chemist, discovered
the chemical con5)osition of natural rubber. In i860, Qreville Williams,
another En^ish chemist, broke down natural rubber by heat and isolated
isoprene, a colorless liquid which is the ’’building block” for the
^Further descriptions, see: ibid,, pp. 56-117; also KLaus E. Knorr,
World Rubber and Its Regulation (Stanford, Calif., 19U5), pp. 155-75*
%or detailed information, vide: Peter T. Bauer, "Rubber and Foreign
Exchange,” Economic Journal, Vol. t (June, 19U0), pp. 231-1(1; and KLaus E.
Knorr, ibid.; also, t’. T. Bauer. The Rubber Industry (Mass., 19U8), pp.75-285.
^Cf., generally, Jean Le Bras, Rubber; Fundament^s of its Science and
Technology, trans. Irene Berch (New York,' 19^7)} and Courtney R. Hall^
History of American Industrial Science (New York, 195U), pp. 2U3-U7f.
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rubber molecule. In 1879> Bouchardat, a Frenchman, changed isoprene
to a rubber-like substance and suggested that rubber is a "polymer,”
that is, a giant molecule made of original molecules linked to¬
gether, Research on the polymerization of isoprene was conducted in
1910 in the Akron laboratories of the Diamond Rubber Company by David
Spence,,,
The first synthetic rubber was produced in Germany during World War I
Tirfien the allied naval blockade caused the German rubber famine. However,
the quality of this synthetic rubber known as Buna, was far from satisfacto¬
ry and gave people a very bad memory which even effected the preference of
rubber users after the Second World War, German scientists in order to be
independent of the source of crude rubber, continually searched for a
better and quality-satisfactory synthetic rubber after World War I, In
1933, the Buna-S rubber, an improvement on the previous Buna type and the
basis for what later became the development of a great new synthetic rubber
industry in the United States, was perfected in Germany,
Meanvihile, the first American cammercial synthetic rubber. Neoprene,
was introduced by du Pont in 1932, Butyl, another form of synthetic rubber
was developed by the Standard Oil Con^jany of New Jersey in 1937; also in
this year the Buna-N was brou^t to this country as a special-purpose rubber.
The butadiene (one of the major raw materials used to produce synthetic
rubber^) plant was constructed by the Goodrich Conqpany in 1939} it was -Uie
first commercial plant in the United States,
In this early stage, owing to their extraordiarily hi^ costs of
^E, B, Alderfer.and H, E, Michl, op, cit,, p, 316,
2
For information regarding the Buna-type rubber and its international
cartel problems, see: Frank'A, Howard, Buna Rubber: The Birth of An In¬
dustry (New York, 19U7)j pp, l-237ff* ' '
^Vide: "Definitions" on page 2 of this work.
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production, all synthetic rubber ■nas selling at very high prices* The
Neoprene, for instance, -was sold at $1 a pound, Buna-N at $1,20 as against
natural rubber selling as low as 3 cents a pound. Since the price of na¬
tural rubber after World War I reached new low levels, the interest in
synthetic rubber-like materials lagged. By 19^0, "the total production
of synthetic rubbers was only an estimated 6|-niillion pounds, including a
few thousands pounds of butadiene copolymer,,,,"! The reason for this
manp-made rubber selling at such a hi^ price and still with a small portion
of market, was dxie to their special qualities, such as being oil resistant,
etc,^ Nevertheless, the technology and know-how of synthetic-rubber pro¬
duction had thus far been developed and was ready for a marvelous and ad¬
mirable performance in the World War II,
A war emergency,-When World War II began, natural rubber was one of
the most critical raw materials. As it has been mentioned previously,
in the prewar years the United States ^though it consumed an average of
527^800 tons rubber each year, produced none. The distance between Singa¬
pore (from where over 90 per cent of American rubber supply used to come)
and Alcron, Ohio (the rubber manufacturing center) is approximately 10,000
miles. Being remote from geographical sources of natural rubber is ob¬
viously a vulnerability of the American economy in a global war.
The government first tried to "stockpile," to build 1:5) enough rubber
in this country before disaster actually came. As early as June, 1939,
the Strategic IJaterial Act was established, which appropriated $100,000,000
for the purchase of important materials over a four-year period. In order
^Paul 0, Powers, Synthetic Resins and Rubbers (New York, 19U3), p, I7U,
2
Vide Glover and Cornell, op, clt., pp,552-53,
to eliminate conflicts among different authorities and to improve efficien¬
cy in securing critical materials, the Congress authorized, in June 25>
I9U0, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) to organize subsidiary
corporations for charging the purchases of specified materials* The
Rubber Reserve Comparer (RRC) Tjas one among them* However, the rubber
stockpiling program was a failure* The stocks of natural rubber at hand
by April of 19U2 were 63U>152 tons, an amount merely for one normal year
consumption, when the principal sources of supply were cut off hy the Ja¬
panese*
The Rubber Reserve Company began and continued during the war to en¬
courage the expansion of the production of wild rubber in Latin American
coxmtriesj this also proved unsuccessful. During the three most critical
years of 19U2 to I9UU, a total of only 113>U00 tons was in^iorted into this
country*
Besides, possibilities of increasing uses of reclaimed rubber at the
same time had been eaqjlored* Its inferior quality limited its widespread
use*
Thus far, the only hope for a reliable and more suitable source of
rubber substitute was the synthetic rubber program* As Charles Popple
described:
***By this time there was little choice; the United States was engaged
in a desperate war for self-preservation, its reserves of crude rubber
were alarrain^y low, and victory was dependent upon the successful
development of a synthetic rubber industiy*,**!
The costs of producing the e:q)ensive rubber substitute, of course, became a
matter of less concern*
^Charles S* Popple, Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) in World War II
(New York, 19^2), p* 50*
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Therefore, our conclusion is the irar emergency caused the development
of the sjmthetic rubber industry in the United States* If there had been
no Pearl Harbor attack in December, 19lil, there -would ha-ve been no ’’rubber
crisis*” Natural rubber -would still be the reasonable and dominant rarr
material for American rubber users. All of the cumbersome price -vacilla¬
tions of natural rubber, the arbi-fcrary way of production restriction
international cartels, and that ill-feelings brou^t by the dependence on
foreign monopoly suppliers, so far as we can see, only stimulated ad-vances
and Interests in the research of synthetic rubber. Limi-ted by its hi^
cost of production and inferior qTxali-fcy in cer-tain aspects, none of these
fac-tors had gi-ven a good enou^ reason to bring forth the mass prodiwtion
of synthetic rubber in this country*
It was -war as a immediate factor that ga-ve the synthetic rubber in-
dus-try a rare golden chance -bo grow: there -was no dominant rival compe¬
tition; no consumers* prejudices and preferences; and above all, no
obs-tacles in ob-taining enou^ funds for its huge initial investments, which
-was full of risks and losses, from a generoiis and helpless in-vestor~the
Go-verrment* Moreover, vuider the sound reason of so-called "national se¬
curity and common defense," this -war-born-baby industry recei-ved go-vern-
ment protection after the war for nearly a decade, vdiich was of -vital im-
por-bance for its survi-val from the fa-bal threat of natural rubber.
CHAPTER III
GROWTH OF THE SYNTHETIC RUBBER INDUSTRY
The Government Created A Erand-Nevr Industry, 19l4l-19li5
Development prior to the Baruch Report.-The critical situation of rub¬
ber had not been fully realized until the investigation of the Rubber Survey
Committee in September, 19h2m The military leaders insisted that Singapore
woiiLd i^ever fall, and this thinking conditioned government policy making.
Few were concerned about rubber supply and demand. Little was done to
remedy the sitTiation either in 19U0 or 19Ul*
A special committee. Commission to the Council of National Defense,
was appointed in June, 19U0 began to study the rubber position. At a
meeting on July 17, 19U0, the Committee recommended a synthetic production
program of 100,000 tons per annum, consisting of 10,000 tons of Neoprene,
30,000 tons of Butyl, and 60,000 tons of Buna-S,^ After the over-all
program was formulated, there was the problem of financing it. In Octo¬
ber, I9U0, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation took the place of other
government groups in responsibility for the rubber program, under the
general direction of Jesse Jones, its chairmanj and operating mainly within
the framework of the Rubber Reserve Corporation, officials of the principal
rubber companies took joint action. Unfamiliar with the situation and
believing the synthetic rubber program had little chance to succeed, the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation was reluctant to invest the money for the
development of the synthetic rubber industry with a capacity of 100,000 tons,
^Buna-S, Neoprene, and Butyl later designated as "CR-S", "CR-M" and
••(R-I" respectively. See page 2 of this work.
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Cf, Charles S, Popple, op, cit., pp, 57-8,
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The program hence was scaled down to U0,000 tons. Even this plan was
eventually abandoned and another program substituted. On March 28, 19hXf
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation contracted with Goodrich, Goodyear,
Firestone, and U, S, Rubber, the Big Four in rubber industry, for the lat¬
ter to build four plants. Each would have a potential capacity of 10,000
tons but equipped for only 2,500 tons. This was the so-called "shadow-
plant" program. During the following period, the program was snagged by
intragovernmental disagreements and jurisdictional disputesj and the govern¬
ment was unwilling to participate in the synthetic rubber program. Many
private enterprises as well as officials had urged such participation.
On May 9> 19l4l> the Office of Production l&nagement, after a careful
review of the situation, sent a letter to the Reconstruction Finance Cor¬
poration recommending "restoration and possible expansion" of the UO,000-
ton program, Pronqjted by this memorandTim, the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation completed agreements with the Big Four for each to build and
operate a 10,000-ton Buna-S plant. However, "there was as yet no synthe¬
tic rubber industry capable of making ary significant contribution,,,,"^
It T»as estimated that these four government-financed plants and four pri¬
vate ones would have 80,000 tons capacity some time in 19U2,
FoUoTring the in^jact of the Pearl Harbor attack in December, I9I4I,
plans for the production of rubber were hastily expanded to 120,000 tons:
30,000 tons to be supplied by each of the four rubber companies. In Janu¬
ary, I9U2, the plans expanded again to a total output of 1|00,000 tons an¬
nually; and in the next months further increase of the planned output
jumped to 805,000 tons, which were broken down as folloyrs:^
^Edward L. Allen, op, cit,, p, 188,
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Buna-S (®-S) 705,000 long tons
Butyl (CSi-l) 60,000 long tons
Neoprene (Ql-M) 14.0,000 long tons
All of the newly constructed plants in this program formulated by the Rubber
Reserve Con^^any throu^ the Defense Plants Corporation, and leased to priva¬
te operators uriio possessed the requisite technique and know-how. These
operators were to produce rubber and sell it to the Rubber Reserve Company-
under a fi-ve-year (19U2-19U7) contract on a "cost-plus fixed fee basis,"
Some of the plants -which were oumed by the pri-vate sector prior to this
program -were sold to the Defense Plants Corporation and upon the time of
transfer of title these plants -were leased back -bo the original owner for
operation, E, L, Allen has de-tailed this in his book, part of -which is
quo-bed here:
Althou^ the -wartime synthetic rubber program -was financed almost en¬
tirely by the federal go-vernraent, the plants themsel-ros -were opera-bed
by priva-be companies*.,,The go-vernment pro-vided the funds -bo enable
pri-va-be companies -which -were to opera-be the plants to select the si-bes,
design the ins-ballations, and conqjle-be the construction. Then the
Defense Plant Corporation leased the plants to these conqDanies for a
rental of one dollar per year. At the same time the Rubber Reserve
Company entered in-bo cost-plus-fixed-fee operating agreements -with the
companies under irtiich the latter agreed -bo manufacture synthetic rubber
and chemical materials required in the manufacture of synthetic rubber
for the needs of the go-vernments,^
These plants included co-polymer plants and feedstock plants. The
feedstock plants -were for producing bu-badlene and styrene, the -two princi¬
pal raw ma-berial ingredients for (H-S; and the co-polymer plants -were for
the production of the actual synthetic rubber. Af-ber completion, the
feedstock plants -were operated by oil companies and chemical companies.
Later it -was found out that actual demonstrated capacities pro-ved
much hi^er than the ra-bed capacity,
^Edward L, Allen, op, cit,. p. 189,
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■whose by-products in turn furnished the ra-w material for these feedstocks5
and the co-polymer plants -were operated by rubber company management for
the account of the government,^
Meanvddle, the famous "patent-pooling” -was urorked out throu^ the
cooperation of all holders of patents on synthetic rubber so that conflicting
ri^ts and in-terests 'were pooled together and the title of the pa-fcents turned
o-ver to the go'vernment agency. This pooling concerned chemical, metal,
petroleum, cons-truction, engineering, and tire manufacturing companies, and
2
proved to be one of the great successes of the ■wartime synthetic program.
The cross-licensing agreements on synthetic rubber were signed on December
19, 19m* and ■the butadiene agreement was signed later on February 5^ 19U2,
The Congress on June 11, 19U2, passed appropriate legislation to remedy
the fact that under the terms of these agreements the participants could
easily be prosecuted for ■violations of the anti-trust laws. For the dura¬
tion of the ■war, and for six months thereaf^ter, each pri^vate corporation
executing the s^tandard form of agreement ■with the Rubber Reser^ve Corporation
■was required ■to gi^ve all of its technical information to the go^vernment
for free exchange,^
^Cf, GLo^ver and Cornell, op, cit,, p,
^Francis Walton, Miracle of World War IT (New York, 1956), p, U7*
^According to Frank A, Howard, op, cit., p, 291, the parties to the
general agreement on exchange and use of ■technical information relating to
bu^badiene -were! Rubber Reser^ve Co., Universe Oil Products Co,, S^bandard
Oil Development Co,, Jasco, Inc., Shell De^velopment Co.j The M. W, Kellogg
Co,, Humble Oil and Refining Co,, Koppers Co,, Koppers United Co., Shell Oil
Co,, Inc,, Shell Union Oil Corp,, Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Co,, Phillips
Petroleum Co., The Lumms Co., Celanese Corp, of America, Standard Oil Co.,of
Louisiana, Hycar Chemical Co,, The B. F, Goodrich Co,, The Dow Chemical Co,,
The United Gas Impro-vement Co., Houdry Process Corp, The parties to agree¬
ment on exchange and use of ■bechnical information relating to styrene ■were:
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Ho'vrever, progress during this period was distressin^y slow. It
was estimated that only 8,383 tons and 22,U3U tons of synthetic rubbers
produced in I9I4I and 19U2 from both private and government-owned plants.
The major factors responsible for this, besides the scarcity of labor and
difficulties in securing supplies and equipment, were conflicts and con¬
fusion among government authorities.
The Committee finds a number of different Giovernment agencies with
overlapping and confusing authority over the synthetic rubber program.
The conflict between the Rubber Reserve Company,...and the Office of
Petroleum Coordinator has delayed and complicated the bringing in of
new facilities for therproduction of butadiene from oil.^
The lack of competent advisors was another weakness in the execution of
the program, about udiich, continued the report:
The production of synthetic rubber represents an investment exceeding
$600,000,000 and is one of the most coii5)licated technical projects
ever undertaken in this country. Yet, in none of the Government agen¬
cies has there been a clearly recognized group of independent experts
to make the technical decisions. Reliance has been placed on one
part-tlem technical adviser aided by committees drawn from industry.^
The establishment of the Rubber Supply Act of 19U2 represented another
kind of trouble. In the mid-year of 19U2, arguments for the choice be-'
tween oil-process and graiiv-process in producing butadiene were presented
in Congress. This was because the oil-men had received financial backing
from Congress to canry out the synthetic program. The agricultural in¬
terests, in order to increase the utilization of the over-capacity of grains,
tried hard to persuade the government to adopt grain-alcohol as the starting
material for butadiene. A subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Agri¬
culture and Forestry therefore began to investigate industrial alcohol, syn¬
thetic alcohol, and also the sjmthetic rubber program. The committee after¬
wards favored the increased supply of rubber manufactured from alcohol pro¬
duced from agricultural or forest products; and meantime, found dissatis-
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faction over the administration of rubber control and a lack of harmony
between the Rubber Reserve Company and the rubber branch of the War Pro¬
duction Board* Thus, the committee worked out a bill which was known as
the Rubber Svqjply Act of 19U2* This was immediately "by both the House
and the Senate* This bill provided an increasing supply of rubber manu-
factured from alcohol and created a rubber si^jply agency*-'
Growth after the Baruch Report*-However, this bill in the President's
eyes was ill advised and Tias vetoed* Recognizing the desperate condition
of the rubber program, on August 6, 19U2, he appointed a fact-finding com¬
mittee to canvass the whole situation and make recommendations for its
improvement* In his message on Senate 2600, he said:
This unusual investigation is being directed because of the interest
of the American people in the subject, because of the great impact of
the rubber upon the lives of American citizens, and because of the pre¬
sent confusion of thou^t and factual statement.***
The functions of this committee require not only experience in business
and production and the relations of Government thereto, but also trained,
scientific minds* Therefore, I am appointing as members of this com¬
mittee, the Honorable Bernard M* Baruch, Chairman; Dr, James B* Conant,
President of Harvard University; and Dr* Karl T. Compton, President
of Massachusetts Institute of Technology*.,! am asking them to recom¬
mend such action as will produce the rubber necessary for our total war
effort, including essential civilian use, with a minimum of interferen¬
ce with the production of other weapons of war.^
(Continued from p. 19) Rubber Reserve Co., Universal Oil Products Co,,
Standard Oil Development Co,, Jasco, Inc,, Koppers Co., Koppers United Co,,
Monsanto Chemical Co,, Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corp,, Phillips Petro¬
leum Co,, The Lumms Co,, The Dow Chemical Co,
^Report of the Rubber Survey Committee, Office of Emergency Manage¬
ment (Washington, i9l).2), pp* 12-3.
^Ibid** p* 13*
^Vlde Public Bill 2li3 (S, 2600), 77th Congress, 2nd Session; also.
Senate 'Report i'^l6 (June 18* 19^2), and House Report 2367 (July 21, 19U2)*
%ranklin D* Roosevelt, "Veto Message” (August 6, 19U2), Report of
the Rubber Survey Committee* op, cit,* p* 67*
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The Committee moved rapidly and mthin 35 days on September 10, 19h2,
issued its report and recommedations. The report began:
We find the existing situation to be so dangerous that unless correc¬
tive measures are taken immediately, this country -virill face both a
militaiy and a civilian collapse....
UriLess adequate new supplies (natural or artificial) can be obtained
in time, the total military and export requirements alone -will exhaust
our crude stocks before the end of next summer."^
It noted that rubber was vital to a modern economy and that the successful
outcome of the war was dependent upon the success of the rubber program.
...the country is dependent, finally, upon the production of synthetic
rubber idiich, it is hoped, will reach its full swing in 19hh»^
The committee reported that the deficit of the military and other
essential needs that had to be met by production of synthetic rubber before
January 1, 19iUi> was 211,000 tons. (See Table U,) It was anticipated
that the production of synthetic rubber by the end of the most critical
year, 19U3> if begun without delay, would be 516,000 tons.3 Only U30,000
tons of Buna-S and Neoprene and a portion of the Butyl rubber could off¬
set the likely deficit of crude. ”...That the whole question of obtaining
synthetic rubber in adequate amounts in 19U3 hinges on the rate of conr-
struction of the manufacturing plants.”^
The ccamnittee, furthermore, recommended expansion of the 805,000-ton
program to 1,100,000 tons capacity a year, (cf. pp. 17-18 of this work),
of idiich 8U5,000 tons should be CH-S (i.e. increased ll;0,000 tons).
Report of the Rubber Survey Committee, op. cit., p. 5*
^Ibid.
3
This would consist of U00,000 tons of Buna-Sj 30,000 tons of Neo-
prenej 62,000 tons of Butyl rubber; and 2U,000 tons of Thioko (from pri¬
vate sources, see this vrork, p. ). Vide ibid., p. 16.
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TABLE k
CRUDE RUBBER POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES,
July 1, I9U2 to December 31> 19U3*
(In Long Tons)
On hand July 1, 19U2 (stockpile) ••...•• 578,000 Tons
Estimated imports July 1, 19U2 to December 21, 19U3. . . . 53.000 Tons
Total crude rubber 631,000 Tons
Estimated military and other essential demands July 1,
19^2 to December 31, 19U3 mith no alloi^rance for tires
for passenger automobiles 8Ii.2.000 Tons
Deficit that must be met by production of synthetic
rubber before December 3I, 19^43 211,000 Tons
*Data from Report of the Rubber Survey Committee. Office of Emergency
Management (Washin^on, I9I42), p. 5«
To assist in the accomplishment of this task, the committee recommended
the appointment of a Rubber Director who would be authorized to administer
the entire rubber program with absolute poiwer. However, the committee
suggested "the present program be pushed forward with the greatest pos¬
sible speed, without further change, except that if new projects are
adopted they be made additions to the present program,
On September 17, 19U2, President Roosevelt in conformance with these
recommendations, appointed William M, Jeffers, President of the Union
2
Pacific Railroad, to be the Rubber Director*
William Jeffers, known as a "tou^ and able" business administrator.*.
Frankly admitting that he knew little about rubber but displaying
business acumen and a complete lact of politesse, he applied his
^Ibid*, p* 15*
2
Vide F* D* Roosevelt, "Executive order 92I46: Providing for Coordina¬
tion and control of Rubber Program," (September 17, 19U2), Federal Regis¬
trar, Vol* vn. No* 185 (Washington, September 19, 19U2), p* 7379*
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managerial talents to create a new industry out of elements of the
agricultural establishment and the chemical, rubber, and petroleum
industries.
In a hotbed of politicians who were anathema to him and for idiom
he never hesitated to express undiplomatic contempt, he had fuller
authority than Jesse Jones had ever enjoyed. He battled lobbyists,
and overcame the lethargy and inefficiency of military svpply experts,
...He remained in charge until the synthetic program was soundly
launched, then resigned late in 19U3i«.«^
Colonel Bradley Dewey succeeded Mr. Jeffers as Rubber Director,
Accomplishments of the wartime program.-We have so far seen that,
the tardy development of synthetic rubber was largely "the result of dis-
sensionsensions between government agencies and of jealousy between pro¬
ducers of rival raw materials."2 The Baruch committee "in some way or
other became final arbiter in most of the disputes that arose,"3 woke up
the American public regarding the desperate situation of rubber, and made
excellent recommendations that accelerated the program to win the war.
William Jeffers, as Rubber Director (often called "czar"), strai^tened
out the muddle and within a year large-scale production began.
In 19U3» synthetic rubber production was 231,722 tons, an amount
ten times that of 19U2 (see TaKLe 6). Instead of a deficit at the end
of that year as the Baruch committee had estimated, there was a stock of
natural rubber of 139tS9k tons (roughly one-third of what it was at the
end of 19li2, and less than one-fourth of what it was in 19i4l). (See
Table 5.)
At the end of 19Uit, Government-owned plants turned out 668,879 tons
^
Francis Walton, op. cit.. p, U7«
2
Fred A, Shannon, America’s Economic Growth (New York, 1951), p» 829,













• • • < • • 781,259 6,259 775,000 553,33U
19U2 39U,Ui;2 17,651 376,791 U22,7lU
19U3 U88,525 170,891 317,63U 139,59U
19hh 710,783 566,670 1101,113 93,650
19U5 799,009 693,580 105,U29 118,715
Data compiled from U, S, Department of Commerce, United States Statis¬
tics, 19l4l-55» (Washington, 1955), pp4 2-8,
TABLE 6
SYNTHETIC RUBBER PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES,
19la-19U5^
(In Long Tons)
Year Totals GR-S^ Butyl^ Neoprene® N-type^ S-iype®
i9ia^ .... 8,383 tm 5,692 2,U6U 227
19U2 22,lt3U 2,276 23 8,956 9,73U IMS
19U3 231,722 181,U70 1,373 33,603 lU,h87 789
19l0i. .... 762,630 668,831 18,890 56,660 16,812 1,U37
19U5 820,373 717,693 k7,h26 15,672 7,871 1,711
Data from U, S, Department of Commerce, United States Rubber Statis-
tics. 19U1-55» (Washington, 1955), pp. U, 6-8.
■®^Not available •
^General purpose synthetic rubber (Buna-S) produced from Government-
OTimed plants.
^All government produced, except for year 19U2.
^Private and government-onmed plants production together,
“All privately produced except for 19iiits 2,06l L.T, and 19U55 19 L.T,
©General purpose synthetic rubber (Buna-S) produced privately,
^Estimated for this year.
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of (51-S, over triple 19U3'sj 1;7>302 tons of (S-M, nearly double the pre¬
ceding year's, and 18,890 tons of (H-I, over ten times that in the previous
year* (See Table 7*) This made a total of 737^131 tons of government
TABLE 7
PRODUCTION OF SYNTHETIC RUBBER IN THE GOVERNMENT-O’JVNED PLANTS,
19U3-Ui^
(In Long Tons)
Types of Synthetic Rubber 19U3 19UU
'
19U5
GER-S (Buna-S) 181,390 668,879 717,688
CE-M (Neoprene) ... 25,611 U7,302 36,332
GR-I (Butyl) . 1,781 18,890 U7,868
(E-A (Acrylonitrile) • • « • 2,060 33
(E-P (Polysulfide type) .»•*•• 750 • • • • • • • •
Totals. 208,532 737,131 801,921
CE-S: in month
January .... 6Uo U9,107 69,9U5
February 617 hh,022 62,598
March 1,712 53,676 69,327
April 3,137 56,U67 66,75U
May 5,682 56,501 72,310
June 9,868 62,823 68,5U3
July. ... 13,060 60,lii9 68,355
August. ..... .. 19,la2 56,876 61,393
September 2U,07U 5U,008 56,356
October .. 29,69U 57,33U 39,199
November. 37,002 61,220 U2,125
December. 36,U92 65,696 U0,783
*Data from Charles S, Popple, Standard Oil Comparty in World War II
(New York,1952), p. 75«
synthetic rubber, an amount more than the total consumption in the same
year (710,783 tons). Production of synthetic arubber reached its hipest
point of 820,373 tons in 19U5, of which 801,921 tons (95 per cent) were
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from the Government-o'wned plants*
The government synthetic rubber program thus far had overcome the
rubber crisis and achieved its primary assignment; to s\:5)port the mili-
tairy activities of the Allies vfith sufficient quantities of satisfactory-
quality synthetic rubber; and successfiiLly established a synthetic rubber
industry Tvhich constituted one of the greatest industrial miracles of all
time*
By the end of 19UU a total of 51 plants had been constructed mth UO
rubber, chemical, petroleum and industrial companies participating in
their operation, representing an expenditure of l700 million by the Federal
government*^ These plants included that for petroleum-butadiene, for
alcohol-butadiene, for butyl, for styrene and for copolymer; located at
many points; Naugatuck, Conn,, Kobuta, Penn,, Baton Rouge and Lake Charles,
La,, Houston, Baytoira, and Borger, Texas, and Los Angeles, Calif* The
largest one was built at Port Neches, Texas and operated by the United
States Rubber, B* F* Goodrich Chemical Con^jany, and Neches Butadiene Pro¬
ducts, Inc* (See Table 13, for reference.)
Since the Government's synthetic rubber program began 1,U00,000 long
tons have been produced, including 737,000 tons in 191U;* Costs of pro¬
duction are shown in Table 8 and Table 9, that petroleum-process GR-S is
22*5 cents per pound and alcohol-process GR-S is h7»0 cents (or 20*9 cents
^According to The Economic Almanac for 19U5-U6 (New York, 19l;5), p*
182, from July 19li0 to December 19U3, the annual rate for the government
investment in synthetic rubber is |170 million, and the preliminary figure
for 19UU is $90 million, making a total of $685 million, plus an additional
$36 million in scramble facilities*
p
RFC, Program for Disposal to Private of Gp-Ti^nment-Ot'med Rubber-
Producing Facilities, March 1, 19^3» pp* 1-5, 50-51*
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if 15-C0nt alcohol -was available) per pound. Neoprene is 23«78 cents
per pound -without pro-vision for amortization of the investment. It is
generally held that Butyl -will be one of -the cheapest, or probably the
cheapest, of all synthetic rubbers, vrith cash costs as low as 10 cents
per pound, or e-ven less. Actually achieved capacity of production in
Go-vernmen-t-owned plants can be seen from Table-10,
TABLE 8














Ad-vance estimate *,,,,,, 8,1 2,3 7,9 18.3
Actual in May, 19l44.« 12,1 2.1i 7.U 22.5
Alcohol-process
95^ 0 gal* of -the alcohc^® . - .
U,6Based on Advance estimate, • * 37,1 7.9 U9.6
Actual in May, 19UU» • * • • * 35.7 U.8 7.1i U7.9
15^ @ gal, of the alcohol
lO.UBased on ad-vance estimate* * * 2,6 7.9 20.9
Actual in May, 19liU^ 8.8 2,9 7.U 19.1
Da-ta from Tariff Commission, Rubbers War Changes in Industry, No, 6,
(Washington, 19Uij.), p, 7f*
^The actual price paid by the plants was of that order in 19Ui,
^hat is to say, -jdiat the actual costs would ha-ve been if alcohol
could have been bought at 15 cents per gallon.
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TABLE 9





in 19U3 May, 19lli
Amortization of investment in 5 years 30.1i5 30.87
Amortization of investment in l5 years 26.U3 27.33
Without provision for amortization 22.ia 23.78
Data from Tariff Commission, op» cit«. p. 7.
TABLE 10
COMPARISON OF THE GOVERNIENT SYNTHETIC RUBBER PROGRAM IN 19UU















Buna-S (®-S), 8U5,ooo 705,000
(
735,000 1,000,000
Butyl. .... 132,000 68,000 75,000 75,000
Neoprene ... 69,000 63,000 63,000 70,000
Thiokol®' ... 60,000 (b) (b) (b)
Totals 1,106,000 836,000 873,000 1,115,000
^ata from Peter T. Bauer, The Rubber Industry (Cambridge, Mass,,
19U8), p. 301, table 1; original data from '^pec'i^ Report of the Office
Director (Washington, 19^1;) •
^Ihiokol is a rubber-like material -nhich can be used to make retreads,
^^ogram suspended.
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Government PostTOSur Protections, 19U5-1953
Arguments for government continuing participations*-Immediately fol¬
lowing the end of hostilities in 19hSt came the revival of natural-rubber
imports from the East, slow at first, gained momentim during 19^6 (in 19U5j
it was ll4.9«3 thousand tons and in 19U6, 380.2 thousand tons^)# There
arose then arguments for protecting American -mar-built synthetic industry
in peace-time.
The need of protection for synthetic rubber from the con^jetition of
natural rubber -was understandable. The quality of synthetic rubber -mas
superior to natural rubber in a number of respects (including resistance
to sun and -weathering, abrasi-ve, oil, and gasoline, etc.), but -was still
defini-tely inferior -bo natural for really hea-vy-duty ser-vice in trucks,
2
buses, airplanes, and earth mo-vers~all were major demand for rubber.
To this, a magazine e:!q)lained clearly:
The slim reser-ve of natural held by the Uni-bed S-bates during the -war
-mas indispensable for two purposes. It is the kind of rubber needed
on big tires like those on B-29's, and_it pro-vides the stickum -bhat
holds all syn-bhetic tires together,,,,-^
During the -mar -virtually all parts of passenger-car tires and many
sections of -bruck tires -mere made from (31-S, United S-ba-bes natural-
rubber reser-ves were spread thin to provide the 1^ per cent of rubber
con-bent in the American passenger tire that cemented it together,..,^
Except for these deficits in quality, the costs of both producing and
fabricating synthetic rubber -were much higher than that of natural. In
the more efficient go-vernment plants the cost of producing C31-S a-veraged
^Commodity Yearbook of 1955. op, cit,, p, 288,
^"Trouble in Synthetic Rubber,” Fortune, Vol, XXXV (June, 19U7), p, 166,
^"Re-versal in Rubber,” Fortune, Vol, XXXIII (March, 19U6), p, 85,
^Ibid., p, 88,
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arround 12 cents~not including amortization and other charges that would
amount to a cent or two more^ and it required ^ per cent more effort of
machine and labor in processing. However, the more efficient plantations
and the native producers could lay down rubber at a profit in New York for
8 or 10 cents, and some believed that costs of natural rubber could be
hrou^t to 7 cents or less,^ We see from these facts, if there were no
protection on synthetic rubber industry, natural rubber could easily push
synthetic out of the market by holding down its price below the cost of
synthetic rubber*
However, if the government decided to subsidize this war-built syn¬
thetic industry in peacetime and continued its participations after the
war, it would consequently mean: (l) control of the world price of na¬
tural rubber artificially, and (2) closing of a large part of the American
rubber market to foreign rubber producers which would bring losses to
$250,000,000 yearly^ to them and depression in the Far East, this in turn
would mean fewer American dollars overseas with which to buy United States
finished products* On the other hand, synthetic rubber as a check on the
price of natural rubber was heartily welcomed by American rubber manufac-
^Tariff Commission, op, cit., p. 7j also, pp,27-29.of this study.
^At the beginning of the war was about 30 per cent more (vide the Baruch
Report, p, 20)* By acknowiedgeing the fact of more processing needed, the
government set the ceiling price of synthetic at 18*5 cents agains 22,5 cents
for the natural during the war, about 28 per cent cheaper than the latter,
3
Figures listed above from "Trouble in Synthetic Rubber," op* cit,, p*
165* HoTiever, there are no reliable postwar figures on costs, it is known
that costs vary widely between producers and between areas* Some regarded
a price of 12 cents would be reasonable one for the natural (vide book of
Peter T, Bauer, op* cit*, p* 310)*
^"U* S* as Boss of World Rubber: Future of Synthetic Plants," U, S*
News and World Report, January 11, 19U6, p* l|It* ——
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tvrrers and fabricators, especially those tire makers, as the previous chap¬
ter mentioned, to vihom stable price is more attractive than low price*^
Another troublesome factor added this problem of Ameirican postwar
rubber-policy-making more complexity was some experts had forecasted that
postwar consumption of world rubber would be far below the total capacity
of production. It was estimated that the world had the capacity to pro¬
duce 1,600,000 tons of natural rubber, 1,000,000 tons of American synthetic
rubber plus U00,000 tons of foreign synthetic, making an annual total po¬
tential production of 3,000,000 tons. Against this estimation, there was
the possibility that world postwar consumption would eventually average
only 1,500,00 tons a year,^ If all capacity of production was used,
according to foregoing estimation, then a disasterous situation could be
easily anticipated. One magazine emphasized this point, contended:
,,,this ruinous 1,500,000-ton surplus could overhang the rubber market
annually, not only menacing the entire economy of natural-rubber pro¬
ducing areas, but also threatening to paralyze the industrial knowle¬
dge essential to keep synthetic developments advancing in the United
States,3
Thus far, it can be seen that the United States stand in a position to
boss the future world marketing, price and production of rubber, and its
decission tied in closely with the whole problem of postwar trade as well as
international relations.
^"For much of the 'twenties and early 'thirties, the rubber manufac¬
turing industry of necessity found that gambles with natural rubber price
trends outwei^ed in the financial statements gains or losses in finished
product sales, A real need Tiras felt for reasonable price stability,”
GLover and Cornell, op, cit., p, 51i8,
2
However, this forecast has been proved a pessimistic one. In 19U7,
the world consmption was 1.7 million tons, and in 1957> it was 3,2 million.
^”U, S, as Boss of World Rubber:” op, cit,, p,
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As "ne shall discuss later, in order to maintain an adequate domestic
bber supply the United States government has adopted a protective policy
d remained in the synthetic rubber industi*y. The maintaining of a
nthetic rubber industry, as the Congress declared, is to strengthen na-
onal security and common defense, in other -words -bo free the Uni-bed
ates from the necessity of importing rubber. But, this purpose, as
hn M« Clark commented in his book, still can not be fulfilled since it
eds to Import more foreign oil to produce synthetic rubber, and this
un-bry finally must depend upon foreign-oil imports.^ The choice, never-
leless, was a political one in the largest sense,
Go-yernment policies before the Rubber Act.-In Janiiary, 19U6, W, Stuart
ming-bon. Surplus Property Administrator, told Congress that disposal of
irplus synthetic rubber plants is so tied iqj -virith international relations
id mili-tary defense that final action must be determined by -bop govern-
int policy-makers, A Washington Interagency Policy Commit-bee on Rubber,
laded by William L, Batt, began to in-vestigate the rubber situation and
I make recommendations on -what to do with the nation’s $700,000,000 es-
blishments of synthetic plants, the s-bockpiling of natural rubber and
her related matters. In March, 19U6, the Committee handed in its report
d recommended as follows: (l) the capacity to produce 2^0,000 long tons
synthetic rubber a year should be kept in production, regardless of
st or need; (2) another annual 350,000 long tons of producing capacity
ould be held in standby condition, and to operate only in case of another
^Vide John M, Clark, Demobilization of Wartime Economic Controls (New
rk, I9I1I+) f ?• 176, for further discussion on policy of imports of oil or
bber. Also, J, B, Conliffe, "Economic Power as an Instrument of National
licy," American Economic Re-ylew Supplement (March, 19lili), pp. 305-3IU.
rubber emergencyj and (3) this 600j000—ton capacity (half of the $700
million synthetic total built during the "vrar) should go into private OTimer-
ship and operation in the long run.^
The most significant suggestion was that the Committee believed that
"even if the armed forces wanted some synthetic capacity preserved it would
not necessarily want to run the plant,” and the private sector, it it owned
the plants, would operate more progressively.^ In addition, by possession
of a large enou^ stockpile of natural rubber, the United States would be
protected in a future rubber crisis, with enou^ time to refurnish locked-
tqp synthetic plants or to build smarter new ones. "The miracle of syn¬
thetic will presumably be far easier the next time, and to maintain non-
oon5)etitive synthetic capacity for military reasons might be a case of 19Ul
thinking in 19U6...."^
In June, 19U6, despite the fact iJiat the Batt interdepartmental commit¬
tee had contemplated postponing disposition untill the sv^ply of natural
rubber came back to normal, the Batt committee and War Assets Administration
submitted reports to Congress recommending immediate disposal of the syn¬
thetic rubber plants. On July 3, 19U6, Congress decided to dispose of
only part of its synthetic-rubber plants, and said in its resolution:
Besolved. etc., that, notwithstanding the provision of section 19 of
the Surplus Property Act of 19hht "the War Assets Administration shall
not dispose of any synthetic-rubber plants and facilities costing the
government in excess of $5,000,000 until 6 months after the submission
to Congress by the Director of War Mobilizations and Reconversion of a
report and recommendations with respect to the establishment of a na¬
tional rubber program designed to protect the United States against
^"Rubber Program," Business Week. March 23, 19U6, p. 28.
^''Reversal in Rubber," op. cit., p. 85.
3lbid., p. 88.
35
con^jlete dependence for rubber upon foreign sources: Frovlded> that
there shall be exen^jt from the provisions of this joint resolution,
styrene plants, and copolymer plants, carbon-black plants, not to
exceed turo alcohol butadiene plants, and copolymer plants to the ex¬
tent that the aggregate total rated capacity of copolymer plants -whose
disposal is au-bhorized hereby does not exceed 20 per cent of the
aggregate -bo-tal ra-ted capacity of all go-vernment-o-wned copolymer plants.-^
In -the folio-wing months, the War Assets Administration sold 18 plants
to pri-vate concerns at -very loir prices. As an example of the buyer's
market for these plants, the $ll-nillion Louis-ville copolymer plant -was
sold to Goodrich for only $U,2 million, A major reason for this lack of
interest -was the fall of natural rubber prices at that time,2 Consequen-b-
ly, 16 of the remaining plants Tihich had been retained by the go-vemment
had -bo be temporarily idled because of lack of demand for synthetic rubber.
(See Table 15 in -bhe folio-wing chapter.)
In the following spring. Congress enac-bed Public Law 2U,3 which con¬
tinued the government's authority to produce and sell S3mthetic rubber, to
allocate all rubber, if necessary; and to continue the system of specifi¬
cation controls. This law also ended the exclusi-ve purchase and sale of
natural rubber by the go-vernment, and thus brou^t back a free market for
natural rubber beginning on May 1, 19U7» (The suspension of rubber trade
-was s-tar-bed on February 7, 19U2.)^
Public Law 2U was due to expire on March 31, 19U8, In September of
"Joint Resolution 17U: Postpontment of Disposal of Synthetic Rubber
Plants," (79th Congress, 2d Session), Congressional Record, July, 19l;6,
p, 8606,
2
Cf, S-banley Vance, American Industries (New York, 1955), p. 308
^Public La-yr 2li (80th Congress, 1st Session), -was appro-ved on Mar, 29,
^For de-bailed information regarding government wartime controls -vide,
particularly, Paul Wendt, "Control of Rubber in Tforld War II," Southern
Economic Journal, Vol, HII (January, 19U7), pp. 203ff,
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►U7, the regulations issued under Public Law 2lt were amended, revoking all
ibber controls with the exception of specifications covering tires, tubes,
id camelback*
Rubber Act of 19U8♦-Natural and synthetic rubber did not have a chance
> compete each other in the war, nor in the years immediately following
le end of the war* However, things became clear after two years con^jeti-
-on of these two kinds of rubber in a ”quasi-free” market. Synthetic
ibber, on the eve of the establishment of a permanent rubber policy in
le Congress, showed an unfavoraliLe position in competition with natural
ibber* Consumers* adverse attitude toward synthetic rubber was one of
le troublesome handicaps.
The consumer animus against synthetic in tires has astonished and
perturbed the United States rubber manufacturers, who were convinced
that synthetic would be able to stand on its own merits,—which, in
fact^ are considerable and in some respects si:5)erior for tire purposes
mce, many tire dealers in this period had to claim that their tires were
ill-natural” rubber instead of telling the truth, and actxmilly by this
jthod they sold a lot tires. The reasons for consumers preference for
itural rubber-tires rather than synthetic-made could be:(l) the bad
[^jression of German tires in the First World War which gave the public
1 idea that synthetic rubber is not reliable; (2) it was generally felt
lat synthetic rubber was only a substitute for natural rubber temporarily
1 a T»ar emergency; (3) the government in requiring people to use a mini¬
mi amount of synthetic rubber continued to stockpile large amounts of
itural rubber for an emergency; and (U) some of the rubber manufacturers
^"Trouble in Synthetic Rubber,” op* cit«* p* ll6*
37
themselves confessed the inferiority of the synthetic-rubber tires, and
■warned the public it should not dri'Te their synthetic-tired-cars ever ^0
miles an hour during the summer of 19U6*^
In addition to the lack of public faith in its quality, synthetic
rubber faced threatening competition from natural rubber, vtfien the latter's
price continued falling. It "was ob'vious, at this time, if the government
decided -bo get rid of its synthetic-o^ubber plants, the pri'vate -would not
bqy these unprofi-bable plants unless they coxild be sure of the probable
future price of natural rubber (some forecast it would go down to as
little as 10 cents a pound) and go-rorment pro-tecti-ve policies against
competition from the crude,^
Thus far, it can be understood clearly what had caused the gevernment
to es-tablish the Rubber Act in 19U8 to remain its participations in the
synthetic rubber industry.
Public Law U69, Ei^tieth Congress, the Rubber Act of 19U8 (appro-ved
on March 31, 19U8), contains the folloTiring declaration of policy of the
Uni-bed S-bates toTvards the domestic rubber-producing indus-try:
Section 2, It is the policy of the United S-bates that -bhere shall be
main-bained at all times in the interest of the national security and
common defense, in addition to stock piles of natm-al rubber which
are to be acquired, ro-bated, and re-balned pursuant to the Strategic and
Critical Ma-berials Stock Piling Act (Public Law 520, 79-bh Cong,, ap¬
proved July 23, 19U6), a -technologically ad-vanced and rapidly expandi-
ble rubber-producing indus-try in the United S-ba-tes of sufficient pro-
ductl-ve capacity to assure the a-vailability in times of national emer¬
gency of adequate supplies of synthetic rubber to meet the essential
cl-vilian, mili-bary, and na-val needs of the country. It is further
declared -to be the policy of the Congress that the security of -the
Uni-bed S-tates can and -will best be served by the de-velopment -within
^Ibid., p. 158.
2
"Re-versal in Rubber," op, cit., p. 88,
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the United States of a free, con^jetitive, synthetic rubber industry.
In order to strengthen national security throu^ a sound industry it
is essential that Government ownership of production facilities.
Government production of synthetic rubber, regulations requiring
mandatory use of synthetic rubber, and patent pooling be ended and
terminated whenever consistent with national security, as provided
in this act.^
The act authorizes the President to exercise controls over rubber
materials and their use in rubber products, and to continue the ownership
and maintenance of Government-owned rubber-producing facilities having a
rated production capacity of at least 600,000 long tons of CR-S and 6^,000
long tons of special-purpose rubber a year until the Congress enacts addi¬
tional legislation permitting the development of a synthetic rubber indus¬
try in private hands under conditions consistent with the national security.
Hence, there would be no disposition of government-oymed synthetic-producing
facilities any time prior to the expiration date of this act*
The act requires also that there should be a mandatory consumption of
at least 200,000 long tons of general-purpose synthetic rubber ((®-S) and
21,667 long tons of special-purpose synthetic rubber (Butyl), Any larger
amount would be required by the government vdienever the situation vfas deemed
necessaiy in the interest of national security and the common defense.
The authority to impose import restrictions on finished and semifinished
rubber products in order to assure equality with like or similar products
produced within the United States in accordance with regulations issued
under the act is also granted. But finished and semifinished rubber pro¬
ducts manufactured in the United States for export exclusively may be ex¬
empted from any regulations issued under the act,
^Public Law k69 (House Resolution ^iAU), Congressional Record, llarch.
19U8
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The act demands that a report on the development of a disposal pro¬
gram of Government-oimed rubber-producing facilities consistent Tidth na¬
tional security be made by April 1, 19U9i and that by January l5j 19^0, the
President shall recommend to the Congress legislation for disposal of such
facilities together -with other recommendations considered desirable.
The Act of I9I48 terminates on June 30, 19^0, Thus, the Rubber Act of
I9U8 established a definite peacetime policy and program for rubber con¬
sumption and production in this country for an effective period of 27
months.
Congress laid dovm a clear-cut national policy...for keeping the
American synthetic rubber industry as a national security measure.
This act in effect recognized the excellent -wartime and peacetime per¬
formance of the new synthetic rubber, toge-ther with the added fact that
the synthetic rubber industry had ended for all time -the nation’s com-
ple-te dependence on foreign sources of supply for this basic raw
material,'^
...The basic postwar policy of the federal go-vernment -with respect
•bo the synthetic rubber industry is con-bained in the Rubber Act of
19U8,.,iidxich -was extended until June 1952...(and) Tiras one of the
most significant decisions the Congress has been made,^
Extensions of the Rubber Act.-The Rubber Act of 19U8 has been extended
twice: the first extension for two years -was enacted on June 2U, 1950,
(Public Law 575, House Report 7579 > 8lst Congress, 2d Session); and -bhe
second one for a period of 21 months -was approved on June 23, 1952,(Public
Law UoU, House Report 6776, 82d Congress, 2d Session)* Therefore, -bhis
act actually was valid until March 31, 195U*
The reasons for these two extensions of this act are as follows;
First', the syn-thetic rubber industry invol-ved stra-begic factors. In
^GLover and Cornell, op. cit., p, 555.
2
Edward L, Allen, op, cit., p, 189*
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facing a continuotis world tension, the government found it necessary to
keep nationalization of this industry under subsidization to maintain a
minimum production capacity at all times whenever the industry cannot
itself ccm5)ete with low-cost and better-quality natural rubber* Second,
rubber controls must be retained for the sake of military security so that
the government can accumulate a stockpile of natural rubber.^
In 1950, there was a Korean War. The unsecured situation of Indo¬
nesia, Indochina, and Malaya caused the government to speed up its stock¬
piling which immediately boosted the price of natural rubber up to its
postwar highest point. It was unaniously agreed that the Rubber Act
must be extended to retain government participation.
In mid-year of 19^3, Congress decided to dispose of government-owned
synthetic-rubber-producing plants in the near future and extended the Rub¬
ber Act to provide a intermediate period for disposition of these plants.
Accomplishments of the postwar protection.-The American synthetic-rub¬
ber industry after eight years (19U5-1953) of government protection, became
an industry standing on its own feet to compete with natural rubber. Costs
of production has been reduced from 80 cents of wartime costs and 23 cents
of postwar costs to arround 18 cents per pound, so that by 19^2 copolymer was
selling at prices competitive with natural rubber.'^ The government-owned
plants were yielding a profit of |62 million in 1953, despite a very liberal
^In order to build up the stockpile, the government can hold down in¬
dustrial demand for crude rubber by making the companies use part of the syn¬
thetic rubber in their products throu^ the rubber controls, and thus prevent
the price of natural rubber from skyrocketing iidien the government and com¬
panies compete with each other in an unregulated market for supplies.
^ Vide Committee on Banking and Currency, Disposal of Rubber Plants;
Senate Reports No. 5791 83d Congress, 1st Session, 19^3, p* 32.
alloYiance for depreciation, despite the operation of the alcohol butadiene
facilities at an appreciable loss, and despite the payment of management
fees and patent royalties.^ (See Table 11.) And, theramost important
achievement is that synthetic rubber served as a reliable supply "with a
stable price. The facilities under private management and government
ownership performed satisfactorily, at least from the point of view of the
independent rubber fabricators. As one rubber fabricator mentioned in
Congress:
The relatively abundant supply of synthetic rubber in this country
during recent years has enabled the rubber manufacturers to operate
on a stable and well-planned basis. The smaller rubber manufacturer
has been able to operate without fear of being cut off from his basic
raw material and without fear of economic ruin through major fluctua¬
tions in price,.,,*
Moreover, the usefulness of synthetic rubber had been increased through
significant technological improvements. Oil-extension process, cold-rubber,
and tubeless-tires are distinctive examples. In the oil-process about
20 per cent of a low-grade crude oil could be added to the synthetic rubber,
and thus increase the quantity. Cold rubber, which gives tires a longer
life than natural rubber, is produced at lil°F, instead of the customary C21-S
at 122°F,^ Its treads has wearing qualities up to one-third greater than
crude-rubber treads, Ihere formerly manufacturers of large-size truck
tires were permitted to use a maximum of 13 per cent (31-S rubber in their
products,^ the iii5)roved quality of cold rubber made possible the addition
^Ibid.
2
Congressional Record, June 21;, 1953* p, Al^OOU.
3
Alderfer and Michl, op, cit,, p, 318,J Allen, op, cit.. p, I98,
^Cf, p, 30 of this work for discussion on the heavy-duty tires.
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of 68 per cent synthetic rubber* As to the tubeless tires, outwardly it
is similar to the regular tire, inside, however, there is a butyl liner
and usually a sealant rubber between the liner and the tread. Their con¬
struction provides protection against blowouts, "When a break occurs in
TABLE 11
STATEMEOT OF PROFIT AND LOSS
GOVERNMENT GR-S AI'JD BUTYL OPERATIONS




19U8 19U9 19U8 19U9
Sales and Other Income , . , , * 18.6 18.6 18.5 18.5
Operating Costs and Expenses
15.0 lU.lCost of Good Sold. ...... 13.6 13.8
Research and Development ... .U .5 — —
Unrecovered Sales Frei^t,
Storage, and Handling. . . . .2 .h .U .3
Administrative Expense .... .2 .2 .2 .2
ItLscellaneous Expense. .... .1 — .1 .U
Depreciation of Operating. . .
Plants and Facilities. * . . 3.0 3.2 3.0 3.U
Interest on Funds Invested
in Operating Assets .u .U .U .U
Total .17,9 18.5 19.1 18.8
Net Profit or Loss .7 .1 —0.6 —0.3
Sales Volume (1,000 long tons) 366 32U 58 5U
*Data from Rubber World, Vol, CXXXI, No, $ (February, 195U)> p, 561.
the tire, they provide a ten5>orary sealing action,^ Besides, this kind of
tire runs much cooler than the ordinary tires and gains longer life thereby,
Althou^ the share of synthetic rubber of the total consumption cons-
1;3
stantlj decreased during the five postwar years, after 19^0 it gained
predominantly over natural rubber (see Table 12). This proved the synthe¬
tic rubber industry through its advancements in technology and under govern¬
ment's protection had established firmly its goodwill and a foundation in
the market.
TABLE 12
RUBBER CONSUMPTION AND STOCK IN THE UNITED STATES,
19h6-19^f







19U6 1,039.3 761,7 277.6 237.5
19U7 1,122.U UU2.1 627.3 129.0
19U8 1,069.U hU2.1 627.3 lUl.5
19U9 988.9 IjiU.U 57U.5 106.6
1950 1,258.6 538.3 720.3 89.2
1951 l,2m.3? 758.3 U5U.0 76.6
1952 1,261.U^ 807.0 li53.8 95.3
1953 1,338.3 78U.8 553.5 112.3
195U 1,233.0 636.7 596.3 ioU.5
1955 1,529.7 89U.9 63U.8 UO.l
Data conqpiled from U, S, Department of Commerce, op, cit«. pp, 2-8,
including latex,includes separately reported uncured scrap, 19^i 1,336 L.T, (0.09^)J
and 1952: 530 L.T, (0.03^).
Withdrawal of Government Participation, 1953-1955
End of the government controls.-The government ended its 12-year con¬
trols over the consumption of rubber on May, 1953. Consumption controls
were first impose in June, 19lilj when the government embarked on a worldwide
1Stanley Vance, op. cit., p, 309.
biying program to build United States stocks of natural rubber and keep
them out of enemy hands* The competition between natural rubber and syn¬
thetic rubber then began* A brief review of the government Trartime and
postwar rubber control is performed as follows:
During World War II, under the first and second War Powers Acts, the
rubber industry experienced drastic and strict controls* The types of
these controls were: (l) prohibition of production: to prohibit the pro¬
duction of nonessential products for civilian purposes; (2) suspended rub¬
ber trade: the government became the sole buyer or producer and seller of
all natural and synthetic rubber; (3) allocations: the government sold
all rubber on the basis of allocations made to individual corqjanies accord¬
ing to the essentiality of the end use of the products; (U) specification:
the government set up the amount of natural rubber it permitted to be used
in the fabrication of given rubber products; and (5) rationing of tires:
tire products were rationed to consumers in accordance also with the essen¬
tiality of the end use of the product*^
Disposal of government-owned plants*-On March 2, 1953, the Administra¬
tor of Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Harry A* McDonald submitted to
President Eisenhower and Congress a detailed proposal to sell the twenty-
nine Government-owned synthetic rubber plants to private industry by ne¬
gotiation rather than throu^ sealed, con5)etltlve bids* The plan was pre¬
pared by Morton E* Tohalem*^ President Eisenhower then on April lU, 1953,
asked Congress to authorize the Government to sell its synthetic-rubber
plants to private industry* The president stipulated that the disposal
^Cf* p. 35.
2
Facts on File* March 19, 1953, p. 86*
should be (1) at a reasonable price, (2) under competitive conditions and
(3) protective of the national security.
There -mere 29 plants for sale. From the viewpoint of the Reconstruc¬
tion Finance Corporation in 19$3t these war-built plants were well-maintained
and moderriLy designed. No obsolescence regarding design or operation
characteristics had been felt a problem ly the RFC or independent engineer¬
ing reports,2 The future market forecast at that time was very bri^t,
so these plants could be operated very possibly at full capacity. The
Reconstruction Finance Corporation predicted that additional synthetic
capacity would soon be required, since the demand for rubber was increasing
sharply. Its report said:
,..discounting these forecasts with all the caution that conservatism
may require, there appears to be no real possibility "Uiat natural rub¬
ber may come into the market in sufficient amount, over a sufficient
period of time, to present a ^nuine threat to the market position of
the synthetic productions,,,,^
Besides, as it has been pointed out in the previous chapter costs of pro¬
ducing synthetic rubbers were reduced to an amount competitive with the
natural. From all the above favorable factors, the sale of these plants
required no sacrifice. This situation is quite different from what hap¬
pened a few years earlier, viien Vance's book described: "The disposition of
surplus property that could scarcely be given away five years earlier now
presented a delicate problem of distribution,"U
^"Rubber Producing Disposal Commission Disbands," Rubber World, Vol,
CXXXVI, No, 5 (September, 1956), p, 88?,
2
RFC, Program for Disposal to Private Industry of Government-owned
Rubber-Producing facilities, March 1, 1953, P, 17,
^Ibld., p, 16,
^Stanley Vance, op, cit,, p, 308.
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On August 7> 1953> the Congress approved Public Law 205 (House Report
No# 5728), the act to authorize disposal of Government-owned rubber pro¬
ducing facilities and for other purposes# Early in October of 1953» Pre¬
sident Eisenhower named Holman D# Pettibone, former President of the
Chicago Title and Trust Co#, chairman^ Leslie R# Rounds, KennebunLeport,
Me#, retired first vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New Tork,
vice chainnanj and Everett R# Cook, a Memphis, Tenn#, cotton merchant
and exporter, member, to the Rubber Producing Facilities Disposal Commission,
to develop a program for selling the government’s synthetic rubber facili¬
ties to private industry.
They met the first time on November 10, 1953, taking on the respon¬
sibility of denationalizing the giant synthetic rubber industry# Between
mid-November, 1953, and January, 1955, the Commission and its small staff
completed the sale arrangements on 11 (31-S copolymer plants, eight petro¬
leum-butadiene plants, one alcohol-butadiene plant, one styrene plant and
one DDM chemical plant# Subsequently, the Commission completed a three-
year lease on the alcohol-butadiene plant at Louisville, and sold the GR-S
facilities at Institute, W# Va,, and Baytown, Tex# Proceeds from these
transactions totaled $28U,8U8,000, some $25,885,000 more than the total
net cost to the government of the entire program#^ The eventual success
came only with the deadline for all negotiations—December 27, 195U. On
that date the Commission announced that 2U units out of its 27 plants had
been sold; no bids had been received on the Institute plant; the Ba3rtown
bid had been rejected as too low; it was negotiating to lease the Louis¬
ville plant, and no sale had been transacted on UU7 pressure tank-cars also
^"Rubber Producing Disposal Commission Disbands," op# cit#
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Baton Rouge, La,. . . 19,000 Copolymer Corp, Copolymer Corp. 6,956 5,000
Akron, Ohio ... . . . 30,000 Firestone Firestone 6,262 2,250
Lake Charles, La, . . 99,600 Firestone Firestone 12,U70 11,650
Baytown, Tex U;,000 General Tire United Carbon 7,786 7,153
Pt, Neches, Tex., . . 90,000 Goodrich Goodrich-Gulf 19,532 13,000
Pt. Neches, Tex., . , 88,000 U, S, Rubber Texas-U, S, Rubber 11,33U 11,500
Institute, W. Va. , . 122,000 Goodrich Goodrich-^Wf 17,852 11,333
Akron, Ohio . . . , , 15,200 Goodyear C-oodyear 7,U63 2,075
Houston, Tex. «... 99,600 Goodyear Goodyear 12,870 11,889
Louisville, Ky. . . . Uii,000 Ky, Syn, Rubber American Syn, 6,572 2,3UO
Los Angeles, Calif. . 89,000 Midland Rubber Shell 15,2U8
Borger, Tex, 63,000 Phillips Phillips 8,690 U,525
Naugatuck, Conn.. . . 22,200 U, S. Rubber U, S, Rubber 9,200 3,200
Butyl Long Tons
Baytown, Tex. .... U3,000 Humble Oil Humble Oil 25,330 17,500
Eaton Rouge, La., , , U7,000 Esso Standard Esso Standard 25,389 1U,857
Data from Walter Adams and Horace M, Gray, Monopoly in j^erica (New York, 1955), pp. 136-37,*^‘Price of $30 million includes the copolymer plant (tos Angeles), the petroleum butadiene plant (Los
Angeles), and the styrene plant (Los Angeles).
^Substantially representative of original cost.

















Lake Charles, La, , . 63,000 Cities Service Petroleum Chemicals 16,509 6,000
Baton Rouge, La,, , , 23,000 Copolymer Corp, Copolymer Corp. 8,973 5,000
Baytown, Tex U6,000 Humble Oil Humble Oil 18,201 8,886
Pt, Neches, Tex,, . . 190,000 Neches Butane Pro- Goodrich-Gulf and 5U,U65- 53,000
ducers^ Tex-US Rubber^
Borger, Tex,, , . . . 7U,000 Phillips Phillips 35,10-0 19,100
Houston, Tex 90,000 Sinclair Food Ifetch, & Chem, 29,96U 2U,197
Los Angeles, Calif, • U8,000 ShellU Shell 19,312 •5H(-
El Segundo, Calif,, . 50,000 Stand. Oil of Calif . Stand. Oil of Calif. 7,83U 1,500
A1cohol-Butadiene Short Tons
Louisville, Ky, . , . 87,000 Union Carb, & Carb, Union Carb, & Carb, 3U,1U2
Kobuta, Pa. ..... 128,000 Hoppers Co. Hoppers Co. 18,638 2,000
2
Gulf, Texas, Atlantic & Pure Oil Cos,
^Each with divided half interest.^Standard Oil of California’s production of crude butadiene is transferred to Shell for purification
along with Shell's crude production.
offered in the program.
On January 2li, 1955 the Jiubber Producing Facilities Disposal Commis¬
sion recommended to Congress to approve its sale of 2U plants to private
interests. (The negotiations had taken two years and 10 months since
its first meeting.) The Congress on March 22, 1955 rejected resolutions
disapproving the proposed sale, (Senate Reports 117 and 118j 8Uth Congress,
1st Session), and a free, competitive synthetic rubber industry therefore
was scheduled to begin on April 30, 1955* result got a mixed recep¬
tion from Congress, including moves to overturn certain sales and others
to reject the whole program, but the final roll call on disposal was de¬
cisive in both chambers. The Senate approved it 55~31j the House approved
283-132,
Formal transfer of iJie 2k plants to the private purchasers followed
on a carefully arranged schedule, from April 21 to 29, 1955. As the
transfer documents were signed, purchasers paid the government the plant
prices, plus cash for inventory items acquired, and took immediate posses¬
sion. Within six months of the end of the original program the Commission
had sold the Baytown plant for $7,153>000 and the tank-car fleet for $2,
279,700 ($2U.86 per car less than it cost the government to build them du¬
ring World War II). The Institute plant was later sold to Goodrich-Gulf
Chemicals for $11,333,000. And the Louisville plant was sold to Union
Carbide and Carbon Co. in early 1956, The disposition of government-owned
rubber producing facilities is shown in Table 13*
The Rubber Producing Facilities Disposal Commission disbanded on Sep¬
tember 23, 1956.
CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYNTHETIC RUBBER INDUSTRY
Evaluation of the Government Fifteen-Year Participations
The Tftartime program,-The objective of the government wartime synthetic
program was to prevent this country from a tragic famine of rubber for both
military and civilian uses during a fatal war. The successful establish¬
ment of the synthetic rubber industry represented one of the greatest mira¬
cles of all time and has been called the second greatest technical achieve¬
ment of World War IT, second only to the development of the atomic bomb,^
This success with a investment of $7^0,000,000, in a period less than two
years (18 months exactly after starting from scratch), and by overcoming
innumerable obstacles occured in the course of construction and production,
was only feasible in such a highly developed econotny like the United States,
New capital must be abundant for the needs of this gigantic project, the
number and skill of labor must be adequately available, and materials for
both construction of buildings and equipment and production of different-
processes products also must be ready for use. Moreover, indirect factors
such as transportation, marketing functions, powers, and so forth were also
indispensable. Obviously, the reasons for this accomplishment was the
incomparable strength of the American econon^, Hanson W, Baldwin, the
authoritative military editor, when refering to the essentiality of indus¬
trial strength to the outcome of modern warfare, commented: "The war a-
gainst Geimiany was won, the war against Japan is being won, because of the
superiority of the industry of the United States, The industrial strength
^Secretary of Commerce, Rubber: 7th Annual Report (Washington, 1955), p.3.
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of America has been the dominating and decisive factor in this tvar....”
Thera "was much dissatisfaction in the execution of this program indeed,
examples like procrastination, indecision, conflict of authority, clashes
of personalities, lack of understanding, delays, and many others; however,
we must remember all these errors happened in a war emergency. In war,
accomplishments should be considered worth more than perfection of perfor¬
mance.
The postwar controls.-The aims of various government rubber-controls
after the World War II were to build up enou^ stockpile of crude rubber
and to protect American synthetic rubber industry from the threat of natural
rubber con5)etition, and thus to maintain an adequate domestic supply of rub¬
ber. Generally speaking, except in 1950, iidien government faced unantici¬
pated increases in the demand for rubber as a result of the Korean War,
and the control system showed its deficiency in mobilization and sound ad¬
justment, these controls have fulfilled their assignments. However, pro¬
tests from overseas rubber--producing countries, especially Malaya and Indo¬
nesia, were signs of unfriendly reactions which have become one of the major
factors that caused these countries to behave quite far from warm accord
with the United States.^
The disposal of government-owned plants.-The most important as well as
controversal critique of the government l5-year participations in the rubber
industry was the disposal of plants. It is conparatively more simple to
create a new Industry than to dispose of it in this counlacy, particularly
^"Industrial Strength for Defense," The New York Times, June 11, 19U$»
^"U* S. Policy on Synthetic Rubber Criticized," Rubber World, Vol.
CXXIX, No. 1 (October, 1953), pp. 113ff.
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■when the created-industry in-volved huge amount of assets and immense con¬
flicting interests* The future characteristics of the rubber manufactur¬
ing as -well as fabricating indus'fepies ■mas the responsibility of government
legislators*
The transfer of go'vernment-o'vmed rubber-producing plants therefore
represen-ted the creation of a new industry* The biggest obs-tacle ivas how
to release the plants in such a manner that all private industrialis'bs would
get an even start in the race for business, and just as the President had
said, ”the benefits of fair competition*'^ should be assured* Hence 'the
primary principle iwhich the Reconstruction Finance Corporation set 15) for
its disposal program uvas to assure competition in the new industry:
*.*the RFC set 1:5) two disposal goals* One "was to avoid excessi've
horlzon-tal integration in ary one s-tage of production* This meant
a diffusion of capacity in butadiene, styrene, butyl, and copol3nner,
so •that finns could opera-te efficiently nd-thout being in a position
to domina-be a particular field. The second goal njas to prevent inor¬
dinate vertical integration by de'veloping "for rubber fabricators gen¬
erally, a truely congjetlti've source of synthetic rubber supply*".
This meant assuring a sufficient volume of output for noncapti've uses
so as to protect rubber fabricators -nho did not purchase copolymer
plants against a -vertical squeeze,^
Howe-ver, the actual performance turned out completely differently.
As we can see from Table 11, 60,6 per cent of the copol3nner capacity sold
■went -to the Big Four—Goodyear, Goodrich, Fires-tone, and U, S, Rubber, and
their subsidiaries in which they held a half in-berest* 12*7 per cent
■went to t-wo corporations jointly owned by small and medium-sized rubber
users—American Synthetic (23 companies) and Copolymer (8 coir^janies)*^
The remaining 26*7 per cent was sold to two major oil companies (Shell and
^acts on File, April I6, 1953> p« ll5j also p* 14^ of this work*
Walter Adams and Horace M* Gray, op, cit,, (New York, 1955), p* 133.
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Phillips), and one chemical company (United Carbon) -mho were expected to
supply most of the non-captive (31-S and who thus exercised predominant influ¬
ence in setting the ’’open market” priceThe other purchasers had to
agree to set aside from 10 to 20 per cent of their output for small business
at ’’fair prices” as required b7 the Justice Department*
One particular case is the transaction with the Shell. It submitted
a package bid of $30,000,000 for the integrated copolymer, butadiene and
styrene facilities at Los Angeles, Despite the fact that Shell refused to
divide its bid, insisting that it would only b^y the three plants as a unit,
and despite the fact that there were ten other bidders for the styrene plant,
three other bidders for the butadiene plant, and five other bidders for the
copolymer plant. Congress approved the sale to Shell Chemical,^
The disposal of butadiene (petroleum) plants followed the same pattern,
and created substantial horizontal and vertical integration. The largest
butadiene plant (Port Neches), accounting for 3h»6 per cent of the govern¬
ment-owned butadiene capacity, was sold to the Goodrich-Gulf and Texas-U, S,
Rubber combine. Attorney General Brownell’s adverse opinion was disregarded.
’’The capital stock of American Synthetic is held by the following
corporations: American Biltrite, Endicott Johnson, Johnson Rubber, Wooster
Rubber, Brown Rubber, Dewey and Almy Chemical (W, R. Grace & Co,), Dunlop
Tire & Rubber, Cyanamid, Faultless Rubber, Goodall Rubber, Hewitt-Robbins,
KTS, Raybestos-Iianhattan, Seamless Rubber, Thermoid, American, Anaconda
Wire & Cable, General Cable, Phelps-Dodge, Rome Cable, Simplex Wire & Cable,
Essex Vfire, The capital stock of Copolymer is held by these corporations:
Armstrong Rubber, Armstrong Rubber Mantifacturing, Dayton Rubber, Gates Rubber,
Mansfield Tire & Rubber, Sears Roebuck, Seiberling Rubber,” Ibid., p, 208,
^bid», p, 13U.
^Vide ’’Senate Report 118 (8Uth Congress): Adverse Report on Resolu¬
tions Disapproving proposed sale to Shell Chemical Corp, of Certain Govern-
Owned Rubber Producing Facilities in California,” Congressional Record,
March, 1955, pp. 2935-2955.
he said:
5U
...design and coiastruction of this plant was found to permit division
of the Port Neches plant, with a certain amount of adjustment, into
two separate units of substantially equal capacity...the sale of each
unit to a separate purchaser would be more consistent with the de'/elop-
ment of a competitive industry than would the sale of the entire plant
to a sin^e company... .^
...the proposed sale of the Port Neches butadiene plant to the joint
venture comprised of four large companies in the petroleum and rubber
fabricating industries posed a number of potemtial antitrxist problems.^
However, the Commission despite the bids of Allied Chemical and W. R, Grace
for the Port Neches plant, decided to accept the Goodrich-Gulf and Texas-
U, S. Rubber offer. This avoided vesting control of this giant plant in
a sin^e company, in turn for a commitment that approximately 2h per cent
of the plants capacity would be sold on the open market.
In all, 63.8 per cent of the government-owned petroleum-butadiene capa¬
city went to companies purchasing copoljmier plants. The remainder went to
Petroleum Chemicals (Cities Service and Continental Oil), Humble (Standard
Oil of New Jersey), and Food Machinery aM Chemical Corporation.
As to the butyl plants, 100 per cent of its capacity was sold to the
subsidaries of a sin^e corporation—Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.
This was because the disposal law required that facilities had to be sold
rather than leased, and imsold plants had to be put in standby condition
and could not be operated by or for the government for a period of three
years. And vinless the facilities sold were capable of producing a minimum
of 500,000 long tons of copolymer and U3,000 long tons of butyl annually,
the whole disposal program was to be disapproved. Standard Oil being the
Rubber Producing Facilities Disposal Commission, Report ix) Congress.
January, 1955j p. 36., quoted in Adams and Gray, op. cit.V p. 135.
^Ibid.
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only bidder, the Commission therefore could not refvise to sell the butyl
plants to it in order to avoid endangering the Tfhole disposal program#^
Adams and Gray criticized this disposition in regard to con5)etition
saying:
...the rubber disposal program achieved no substantial disfusion of
economic povrer. It perpetuated and reinforced the dominant position
of the Big Four rubber companies -who already accounted for about 76
per cent of tires and inner tubes, 80 per cent of rubber footwear, and
83 percent of rubber reclaimed rubber—companies "vdiich as recently as
19l|.7 had pleaded nolo contendere to an antitrust indictment charging
them (and four others) with agreements to fix prices, discounts, bonus,
allocation of sales to government agencies, etc....^
Besides, the price of the disposal was quite inadequate when calculated
at an earning-power basis. In terms of original cost, the sale price re¬
turned a substantial portion of the ta3q)ayer*s investment, but in terms of
earning power—a popvilar basis of evaluation of a firm on sale, the dispo¬
sal price could be justified by the following arguments:
assuming operation at only 80 per cent of capacity and assuming
continuation of the synthetic rubber price at 23 cents per pound and the
butadiene price at lU cents per pound—the ’’total estimated net profit
after taxes for the butadiene--petroleum and copolymer plants is l32,505j
l86. If the sale value of the facilities vrere put at 10 times armual
earnings, the total sale value would be $325,0^,860. If the contract
for the butyl plants and the butadiene-alcohol plant are added, the to¬
tal sale value would be $359,U28,860 (Congressional Record, IJarch 22,
1955, p. 2883). Yet the negotiated price for all facilities, as announ¬
ced by the commission, was $259,529,000 for assets as of August 31, 195U.
On the more realistic assumption that the plants will be operated at
full capacity, the annual profit after taxes would...be $Iil,0U7,330.
Capitalizing those earnings figures at the rate of 10 times, which is
$!4l0,U73,300 and if the price of synthetic rubber were raised 1 cent
...the capitalized value would be increased to $U80,532,590. If the
price of synthetic rubber were increased by 3 cents in accordance with
_the testimony of Mr. Tohalem (Special Deputy for Rubber Facilities
Disposal of the R.F.C,), the capilized value of the plants would zoom
to $58U,6^,170, (ibid., p. 2881). Indeed, the forecast of a 3 cent
^For further information vide: Adams and Gray, op« cit., p. 139-UO.
^Ibid., p. 139.
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increase in price may be overly conservative in view of a Wall Street
Journal report (March 11, 195U) that the price of synthetic may well
rise to thenatural level of 30 cents per pound,!
Thus, the government sold the plants at prices which amounted to a
capital subsidy, and thus made it more difficult for new producers to enter
the industry in years to come. (See Table llj,.)
TABLE lU
DISPOSAL PRICE AI® VALUES AT DIFFERENT BASIS OF THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED
SYNTHETIC-RUBBER-PRODUCING PLANTS*
Items Price or Value
Disposal price (as of August 31 ^ 195U) $2^91529*000
Values at the basis of earning powers
Market price^ at 23^ @lb., 80^ of capacity^, 359>U28,860
Market price at 23^ @ lb,, 100^ of capacity, ...... l4l0,U73»300
Market price at 2k^ @ lb., 100^ of capacity U80,532,590
Market price at 26?5 @ lb,, 100^ of capacity 58U»65l*170
^ata from Walter Adams and Horace M, Gray, op, cit,, pp, 209-10,^Price of synthetic rubber,‘^Including butyl, butadiene and copolymer plants.
Another criticism arose that Congress seemed to have decided to dispose
of the plants even at the expense of competition in the industry,
...That the government, under the stress of war conditions, had turned
to the big companies—with their existing organizations and technical
knowledge—to manage these plants is understandable. That it froze
into the long-run structure of the industry an expedient adopted in
dire emergency is less justifiable. In 1955, there was no compelling
reason for hasty or immediate disposal,,,,^
...Congress could have given the agency a freer hand. With respect
Adams and Gray, op, cit,, pp, 209-10,
^Ibid., p. 133.
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to arqr given plant, the Commission should have been able to say: ”We
shall sell thispplant, provided there is genuine competitive bidding,
provided the government is offered full fair value and provided the
sale will promote effective con^jetition. Otherwise, we shall continue
to operate the plant as hitherto.” Had the Commission been placed in¬
to this kind of bargaining position, the bid pattern might have been
different....
Nevertheless, on the other side there were credits to the disposal
achievements:
...without cost to the taxpayer are among the most outstanding achie¬
vements in all American industrial history.^
The synthetic rubber industry, born as a government monopoly in the
early anxious days of World War II, has passed to private ownership,
the American concept of free enterprises has become a reality,..The
government will received substantial corporate tax payments as a
result of private operations...,^
Effects of the Growth of the Synthetic Rubber Industry
Changes of internal rubber market.-One of the major effects of the
development of the synthetic rubber industry in the United States ii^jon its
internal market is the change of the source of supply. Prior to World
War II, natural rubber dominated the American rubber market for more than
twenty years, nearly all new rubber consumed in this country was crude
rubber from the Far East, However, after the war, natural rubber never
1
did gain back its prewar monopoly situation.
During the war, natural rubber lost 86 per cent of its market to syn¬
thetic rubber. In the following postwar years, the low-priced natural
rubber shared 58 per cent of total American consumption, which is the highest
^Tbid., p, lUo,
2
Alderfer and Michl, op, clt.. p, 30U,
3
Rubber Producing Facilities Disposal Commission, op, cit.
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yearly average it achieved from the cessation of World War II to the present,
hcnrever, its normal portion of the market is around UO per cent. Since
the transfer of government-owned synthetic rubber plants to private industry
in the mid-year of 1955, natural rubber has been compelled to reduce its
share of the market to 36 per cent in 1957, 'vdien ■American big rubber com¬
panies maintained the price of their quality-improved synthetic rubber at
the price similar to the government set price prior to the disposal, (See
Table 15.)
TABLE 1^
niDEX AND SHARES OF RUBBER CONSUMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES,
19UO-1957*
Year




Total Natural Synthetic Natural Synthetic
19U0 6U8.5 6U8.5 MM 123 100.0
19l4l 781.3 775.0 6.3 IhS 99.2 0.8
19h2 39U.U 376.8 17.7 75 95.5 U.5
19U3 Ii88.5 317.6 170.9 93 65.1 3U.9
19hh 710.8 lliU.l 566.7 135 20.3 79.7
19U5 799.0 105.U 693.6 152 13.2 86.8
19U6 1,039.3 277.6 761.7 197 26.7 73.3
19U7 1,122,U 562.7 559.7 213 50.1 19-9
19l;8 1,069.U 627.3 Uii2.1 203 58.7 Ui.3
19U9 988.9 57U.5 UlU.U 187 58.1 ia.9
1950 1,258.6 720.3 538.3 239 57.2 li2.8
1951 ..... 1,21U.3 U5U.0 758.9 230 37.5 62.5
1952 l,26l.U U53.8 807.0 239 36.1 63.9
1953 1,338.3 553.5 78U.8 2U3 Ll.3 58.7
195U 1,233.0 596.3 636.7 23U U8.1i 51.6
1955 1,529.7 63U.8 89U.9 290 la.i 58.9
1956 1,U85.1 562.1 923.0 281 37.9 62.1
1957 1,U67.5 539.1 928.U 278 36.5 63.5
*Data compiled from U. S. Department of Commerce, op. cit., various
yearsj
In thousand long tons.
^Average of 193U to 1939, 527,800 tons, is the basis, i.e, equal to 100.
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From Table 15> we can see another phase of the change of marketo The
total consumption of neur rubber in the United States grew continously from
I9U0 until 1955, being of 290 per cent of the average during 193U to 1939*
The primary factor responsible for this rapid groivth of rubber consumption ,
is obviously the prosperous development of the automotive industry in this
country*^ The severe competition between natural rubber and the synthetic
provoked tremendous expansion of consumption in the non-transportation seg¬
ment, and opened a new field for the use of rubber. In 1939, the tire
industry used over 75 per cent of the total rubber consumption, vdiereas in
1955 it used only about 6U per cent. This shows how successful are the
expansion of the secondary uses of rubber. We must remember the total
quantity of consumption in 1955 was nearly three times that in 19U0.
The competition between synthetic rubber and natural rubber can be
seen from Table 16, The price of natural rubber has been checked by that
of synthetic rubber, except for the Korean War years when more synthetic
rubber used. The price of synthetic rubber when controlled by the govern¬
ment was found to be quite stable. Because of this advantage it can be
anticipated a few years later that consumption of synthetic rubber will be¬
come a predominant source of supply for this country, provided the quality
of the synthetic continues to be ingjroved. The quality of synthetic rub¬
ber, as it has been pointed out in the previous chapter, is now competitive
with that of natural rubber.
The cost of producing synthetic rubber during World War II was inor-
^According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States of 1957,
op, cit,, that motor-vehicle”'trave]rin~thiF"countey'lre^"'So370I-Slliorr'








Natural Synthetic Natural Synthetic
1935-39^ . . 16.09 1|3.8 mmmm
19U0-iUt** . . 21.98 18.50 37.7 12.7
19U8 21.9 18.5 52.3 36.8
19U9 17.6 18.5 U7.9 3U.5
1950 ia.3 19.0 60.0 hh.9
1951 60.9 25.0 37.8 63.2
1952 38.6 23.5 37.8 67.2
1953 2l;.l 23.0 U6.1 65.2
195U 23.U 23.0 U9.8 53.0
1955. .... 39.0 23.0 52.7 7U.2
1956 3U.3 23.7 U6.9 73.1
*Data compiled from Commodity Yearbook, and United Nations, Statis¬
tical Yearbook, various years.
ISpot crude rubber prices in New York (ribbed smoked sheets, planta¬
tion rubber. No. l)j in cents per poxmd,
^In thousand long tons.
**Average for each five years.
dinately hi^ due primarily to the hi^ costs of apparatus and materials
used in much of the production. Costs are much lower in the permanent
industry built around the use of petroleum, which now turns out to be 13
cents to l5 cents. During 1935 to 1939 the average price of natural rub¬
ber in New York was 16.09 (see Table 16), it has been estimated that na¬
tural rubber should be around 12 cents. Of course, comparative raw mater¬
ial costs are not the sole criterion to determine the future of these two
types of rubber. As we have mentioned, originally, rubber fabricators
encountered considerable difficulty in utilizing synthetic rubber even Tdien
a
combined Yrith considerable quantities of natural rubber. These obstacles
thou^ have been overcome largely. There still are some manufacturers 'vriio
"would prefer to use nothing but natural rubber. Oj^ the other hand, there
are some manufacturers udao ha-ve nothing but praise for synthetic. In ad¬
dition to this, rubber demand is quite inelastic as "we know, costs of rubber
sometimes are of little concern to rubber manufacturers and this particular
condition can be clearly understood from Table 17. Vilhenever demand goes
high, price becomes a secondary consideration for consumption. Howe"VBr,
from the same Table ws can see in the long run, price is a major factor
to influence the buyer’s decision, -while syn-thetic rubber at least owns no-w
three ad"van"bages: lo-wer price, stable price and impro-ved quality. Besides,
synthetic rubber is more capable of expanding its production capacity in a
shor-ber time than the natural. In facing an increasing demand for rubber
and "wide applications of non--transportation rubber products in this country
and a declining production of natural rubber abroad, the future market for
synthetic rubber in the United States is bri^t.
Another noticeable change is the increased amount of exportation of
S3rnthetic rubber in recent years. (See Table 18.) During World War II,
American and Canadian synthetic rubber supported the allied nations consi¬
derable rubber demand. During the -war, from 19Ul to 19UU, this country
exported 12l;,U05'tons of synthetic rubber. After the -war, synthetic rubber
exports declined each year because the go-vernment had no intention to com¬
pete -vrith natural rubber abroad and provoke bad reaction. Howe-ver, a lit-fcle
amount of special-purpose synthetic rubber uvas exported for uses in special
ways. In the years after 19^0, the obvious increases of exportation of
general-purpose rubber (-which is the kind that can be used alternati-vely to
TABLE 17
MONTHLY CONSUMPTION OF SYNTHETIC AND NATURAL RUBBER IN THE UNITED STATES,
5.9U8-1956*




Price^ Natural Synthetic Price^ Natural Sjmthetic Price^ Natural Synthetic
January . • « 21.9 58.2 li3*0 19.2 50.2 •37.1 18.U 60*0 31.0
February. , . 20.5- 51.0 35.U 18.5 U6.3 3U.9 19.5 56.6 31.9
March , . , . 20*U 5U.li 38.2 19.1 53.1 3U.0 19.7 60.9 37.6
April .... 22.9 50.7 3U.6 18.5 U7.9 36.5 23.8 57.9 38.1
May 23.3 52.0 35.3 17.8 U6.1 35.3 28.6 63.8 U6.U
June. .... 22.8 55.7 39.2 16.3 U7.1 37.2 30.9 63*3 U8.6
July 2U.3 U8.8 3U.5 16.U U0.6 30.1 38.U 61.U U3.7
August. , . . 23.7 93.n 39.3 16.7 U5.3 3U.U 52.1 6U*3 50.U
September . . 22.8 52.1 39.2 17.6 Uii.o 32.U 55.8 61.3 li9.6
October ... 22.2 U9.6 38.U 16.3 51.2 33.7 63.8 69.2 5U.5
November. . . 19.7 51.6 37.7 16.7 92.1 31.7 73.2 51.3 U8.3
December. . . 18.9 I4.6.O 35.ii 17.7 52.9 31.8 71.I1 U5.0 53.U
Totals — 627.3 1U;2.1 — 57U.5 UlU.U — 720.3 538.3
Averages 21.9 52.3 36.8 17.6 U7.9 3U.5 Ul.3 60.0 UU.9
*Data compiled from Gommodity Yearbook, various years; original data from Bureau of Labor Statistics
and Rubber Manufacturers' Association*
^Pricd of natural rubber (smoked ribbed sheets. No* 1, plantation rubber), in New York; cents
per pound*
TABLE 17 — Continued
(In Thousand Long Tons)
Month
1951 1952 1953
Price^ Natural Synthetic Price^ Natural Synthetic Price^ Natural Synthetic
January • , . 73.5 lUt.6 59.6 37.0 70.3 29.5 1;7.8 72.8
February. . . 73.U 37.6 53.3 3U.8 66.6 27.2 1;5.2 68.9
March . . . . 35.3 65.6 50.5 35.7 69.7 26.0 50.7 77.9
April , , , , 67.5 39.5 58.8 U8.5 36.1; 68.5 21;.!; i;9.U 77.2
May 66.0*^ U2.U 65.0 U8.5 36.3 67.3 25.0 1;6,9 72.2
June 66.0"^ Uo.o 6U.9 38.0 36.9 66.2 21;. 5 18.2 71.8
July 52.0^’
52.0^
35.5 61.1; 31.5 32.8 58.6 23.9 U3.9 61.3
August, . . . 36.5 67.3 30.5 32.9 61.2 23.1; 1;3.7 58.2
September . . 52.0 36.9 6815 27.5 39.3 66.7 23.5 1;5.2 58.7
October . . . 52.0^«^ 37.U 68.9 27.0 1;5.1 75.0 20.0 1;6.7 58.5
November, , , 52.0** 35.0 65.U 29.0 la.7 66.2 20.6 i;3.3 52.7
December. . . 52.0** 33.3 6o.U 30.0 1;U.8 71.6 20.9 U2.U 50.9
Totals. . . . — U5U.0 758.9 1;53.7 806.9 553.1; 782.1
Averages, , . 60.9^ 37.8 63.2 38.6 37.8 67.2 2l;.l 1;6.1 65.2
Trading suspended April 2, 1951, resumed March 3, 1952.
TABLE 17 -- Continued
(In Thousand Long Tons)
^a95U 1955^ 1956
Month
Price^ , Natural Synthetic Price^ ' Natural Synthetic Price^ Natural Synthetic
January , . , 20.U U7.0 50.2 32.5 56.9 68. U UO.8 53.8 78.5
February. . . 20.3 53.7 56.1 31.3 58.5 67.7 37.3 50.3 75.2
March .... 20.3 53.7 56.1 31.3 58.5 77.2 3U.5 50.0 77.9
April .... 21. U 51.5 53.7 32.3 53.0 72.1 32.3 U7.U 7U.7
May 21.3 51.U 52.6 31. U 50 75X" 30.U U8.3 76.U
June 23.1 5U.3 57.2 3U.8 56.3 79.5 30.8 13.6 67.8
July 2U.U 37.9 ijl.6 liO.O U6.2 62.9 33.5 38.U 58.2
August. . . . 23.1 38.1 U2.1 U5.5 UB.h 72.7 36.5 h6.7 72.5
September . . 2U.1 52.U 53.9 ii9.3 51.0 76.U 32.5 UU.2 69.2
October , . . 26.5 56.0 58.3 U3.3 55.0 80. Li 32.1 52.2 82.0
November. . . 27.3 53.3 57.3 U5.3 52.8 81.7 3lj.5 1;2.9 71.5
December, , , 28.8 55.1 6U.1 U7.0 hQ.h 76.0 36.5 U5.2 73.3
Totals. . . ,
■
— 597.6 636.2 632.1 890.U — 563.1 877.3
Averages. . . 23.li U9.8 53.0 39.0 52.7 7U.2 3U.3 li6,9 73.1
"^Free synthetic rubber industry began on April 30, 1955, ■when government-onmed plants transfered
to private interests.
65
the natural) pointed up losses of a portion of the world market for natural
rubber—at least in the sense regarding the new development areas of rubber
application. The rate rose continously in recent years, until in 1955> it
reached a substantial amount of 1U9>168 long tons over total exportation in
World War II, of which three-fourths was general-pinrpose synthetic rubber.
Thus, synthetic rubber in the United States will serve in the near
future a dominant portion of internal market demand and will also have a
potential market abroad provided demand for rubber in this country and a-
broad continues to increase at the present rate, which is quite possible.
TABLE 18








I9I4I (estimated) . . 572 572
19^2 1M9 222-5 1,197
19U3 18,1U8 lli,937 3,211
I9UI1 10U,266 98,380 5,886
19U5 83,778 76,555 7,223
19U6 72,697 68,763 3,93U
19li7 11,385 7,951 3,Ii3U
1918 U,87U 1,093 3,781
19U9 -. . 6,U83 i,Uoi 5,082
1950 7,652 900 6,752
1951 9,2U9 U83 8,766
1952 22,101 9,U67 12,63U
1953 22,668 7,692 1U,976
195U 30,117 11,069 19,0U8
1955 93,290 60,70U 32,586
1956 1U9,168 112,366 36,802
^ata from U. S. Department of Commerce, op. cit.
^Including (MS from government plants, S-type or SBR-type from private.
Including Butyl, Neoprene, and N-type.
3Derived from allocation for export.
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Changes of external rubber market««^ince the development of the synthe¬
tic rubber industry in "Uie United States during World War II, the world
has more natural rubber for other countries to consume than prior to the
war when the rest of the world had to compete with the dominant buyer—




(In Thousand Long Tons)
Year Total
By type By Country
Natural Synthetic U.S. Others
19U0 1,152.5 1,110.0 i;2.5 6U8.5 50U.0
i9ia 1,312.5 1,2U0.0 72.5 781.3 531.2
19U2 877.5 765.0 112.5 39k.k U83.1
19U3 907.5 615.0 292.5 U88.5 I4I9.O
19iUi 1,125.0 387.5 737.5 710.8 la]i.2
19li5- .... 1,127.5 262.5 865.0 799.0 328.5
19U6 1,U67.5 555.0 912.5 1,039.3 U28.2
19U7 1,735.0 1,110.0 625.0 1,122.U 612.6
19U8 1,902.5 1,U22.5 hQo.o 1,069.U 833.2
19li9 1,887.5 i,i;37.5 U50.0 988.9 898.6
1950 2,285.0 1,705.0 580.0 1,258.6 1,026.1;.
1951 2,312.5 1,500.0 812.5 2,21i;.3 1,098.2
1952 2,335.0 i,li5o.o 885.0 1,261.U 1,073.6
1953 2,U87.5 1,615.0 872.5 1,338.3 l,ll;9.2
195U 2,505.0 1,765.0 7U0.0 1,233.0 1,272.0
1955 2,932.5 1,870.0 1,062.5 1,529.7 1,1;02.8
1956 3,020.0 1,885.0 1,135.0 1,U85.1 1,531;. 9
1957 (est.) . 3,170.0 1,910.0 1,260.0 1,U90.0 1,680.0
Data compiled from Rubber World, various volumes, with the original
data from International Rubber Study Group (IRSG)j and Jean L, Bras, Rubber,
Irene E. Berck (trans,), (New York, 19^7), p» 3U, table 3. All figures
excluded consumption of U.S.S.R. and China,
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From Table 19> it can be seen easily , that consun5)tlon of the rest of the
•norld rose continuously after the -war and moved ahead of American consump¬
tion in both 1953 and 1955* It T»as estimated in 1957^ that an amount of
1,680,000 tons of sjmthetic and natural rubber -would be consumed by the rest
of -the -world as against 1,U90,000 tons consumed in the Uni-ted Sta-bes.
Taking consumption in 19i|l to be the basis, this estimation reveals that
consun^jtion of -the rest of the -world is three times -what it -was in 19lil,
-while that of the United S-tates increases only tiro times (also see Table 19).
TABLE 20
WORLD SYNTHETIC RUBBER PRODUCTION,
19la-1956*
(In Thousand Long Tons)^
Year Total
United States
Amount Share of To-bal
i9ia 77.5 8.1 10.1i5 -
19U2 120.6 22.5 18.66
19U3 ^ . 350.1 231.8 66.21
19iU: 900.5 76U.O 8U.8U
19ii5 866.2 , 820.3 9U.71
19U6 806.7 7UO.O 91.73




19U9 UtO.U 393.7 89.UO
19SO ........ 53U.7 li76.2 89.06
1951 . 908.3 8U5.1 93.OU
1952 877.8 798.6 90.98
1953 935.7 8U8.5 90.68
195U 716.U 622.8 86.93
1955 1,085.3 970.5 89.U2
1956 1,211.0 1,079.6 89.15
*Da-ta from United Nations, op« cit., 19^6, p. 2hh»f original da-ta fur¬
nished by the In-ternational Rubber Study Group (London), except for the year
1956^furnished by the U. S, Depar-tment of Commerce.
'Original data by metric tons, changed into long tons by using a ratio
of 0»98l4l96U2 metric ton:: 1 long ton.
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Since nearly 90 per cent of world synthetic rubber production (excluding
that in Russia) was from the United States (see Table 20), it can be seen
from Table 19> the increased part of world consumption could be met be¬
cause of the development of the synthetic rubber industry in the United
States, If there urere not this new source of s\:5)ply, natural rubber would
definitely not be able to meet the postwar rubber demand,^ Generally
speaking. Table 19 gives us the impression that synthetic rubber consumption
was reduced as soon as sufficient natural rubber was available and increased
again in order to meet the needs of total consumption which as we have pointed
out before, resulted from increased automotive production, and as a result
of the ever-expanding applications of rubber.
From Table 2 we can see that the rate of increase in production of
natural rubber is quite slow. Its production in 1955 compared to that in
I9I4I is 19,6 per cent more, and to that in 19U7 is 50.7 per cent more;
while in Table 20, it shows synthetic-rubber production in 1955 is 1,300
per cent more than that in 19Ul and 92.0 per cent more than that in 19U7,
This simple and roug^ computation gives us a general idea about the slow
growth of natural-rubber production in recent years. Comparing this with
the rapidly increased world consumption, we can see the latter is greater
than the former to a great degree. This is the reason to believe that
synthetic rubber will have a more important place in the international rub¬
ber market in the future, (The increasing exportation of American synthe¬
tic rubber discussed in previous sections points out signs of this development.)
^According the estimation of Rubber World, Vol. CXXI, No. 5 (February,
1950), p, 561., the potential capacity of natural-rubber production
in the world is 2,125,000 tons annually; of which, IJalaya shares a portion
of 750,000 tons and Indonesia shares 900,000 tons, (i.e. Malaya and Indonesia
combining share 1,650,000 tons of total capacity).
The increase of synthetic-rubber production presents a real threat
to natural rubber, and in turn promotes the development of research in the
natural-rubber planting method. One distinguished success is the bud
grafting method vihich increases the productivity of rubber plantations ly
nearly double ■what it "was. This method has been applied by Malayan plan-
■ters generally. It is estimated that in I960 a subs'tantial amount of in¬
crease in production -will be possible.^
^Ca.o'ver and Cornell, op« clt«, p. 5U7.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AMD CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this work was to undertake a comprehensive study of
the extent, causes, and effects involved in the development of the synthe¬
tic rubber industry in the United States for the years from 19^0 to 1957*
Historical background»-Owing to its strategic characteristics, syn¬
thetic rubber had been developed by the Germans quite early in World War I,
and continued to be explored and developed after the war promoted by the
erratic si:pply of natural rubber. However, its extremely high costs of
production limited the synthetic rubber to be produced commercially in
\
peacetime. There came a golden chance for this supplementary good to be
developed during the World War H, -nhen the technology and know-how of the
production of synthetic rubber were ready for mass production. The syn¬
thetic-rubber program became the only hope that could rescue this country
from a rubber famine. Hundreds of millions of dollars were poured into
this program and a new industry was established. Therefore, the war is
the immediate cause for the development of the synthetic rubber industry
in the United States, and its strategic importance and the erratic supply
of natural rubber were constant promoters of the advancement in research
on synthetic rubber prior to World War II,
Wartime creation of the industry.-The government as well as the public
did not realize the vulnerable situation the United States faced until the
publicity of the famous Baruch report on September 10, 19U2, There was
little accomplishment by the government synthetic-rubber program before
this date. Conflicts, delays, indecisions and many other similar obstacles
t3rpified the progression of the program during that time. Things became
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different after the Baruch report and the synthetic program was speed up
by the outstanding Rubber Director, William Jeffers, Instead of a deficit
of natural rubber at the end of 19U3 as the Baruch Committee had predicted,
there was a stock of 139,59U tons; and in the following years, synthetic
rubber served around 80 per cent of this country's rubber requirements and
in turn saved this country from a disasterous rubber-crisis. Fifty-one
plants had been constructed Trith UO rubber, chemical, petroleum and indus¬
trial companies participating in their operation, representing an expendi¬
ture of $700 million by the Federal government. These plants included
those for petroleum butadiene, alcohol butadiene, butyl, styrene and copo¬
lymer* The production of these plants in 19UI4. was 801,921 long tons of
different types of synthetic rubber, A million-ton production was sche¬
dules to take place in 19hB when the cessation of World War II intem?)ted
this program.
Government postwar protection.«^fter World War II, because the govern¬
ment intended to maintain a domestic source of rubber supply which would
prevent this country from getting into another rubber crisis, it retained
ownership of the war-built synthetic-rubber-producing plants and kept on
various rubber controls until mid 1955* The improvements in quality and
stability of •ttxe price of synthetic rubber over this long period of protec¬
tion has enabled the synthetic rubber industry to stand on its own feet
conpeting with natural rubber. Since 1950, synthetic rubber shares each
year more than half of the new rubber market thus becoming a primary source
of rubber supply in the United States,
Withdrawal of government participation,-On August 7> 1953, Congress
passed the law to authorize disposal of Government-owned rubber-producing
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facilities and the President gave three conditions for the disposition:
1# Disposal price should be reasonable5
2* Competition should be maintained; and
3» National security should be assured.
The Rubber Producing Facilities Disposal Commission within 2 years and 10
months accon5)lished the sale of 2U of the 29-disposing-plants. (The other
22 government wartime-built plants had already been sold in 19U7.) The
whole job was finished in September, 1956, and the Commission disbanded on
September 23, of the same year.
Evaluation of the government programs.-Both the wartime and postwar
programs were quite satisfactory. However, the disposal program let three-
fourths of the government-OTmed plants go into the hands of the Big Four—
Goodyear, Goodrich, Firestone, and U. S. Rubber, and the selling price on
the basis of earning power was far from adequate.
Effects of the development.-Synthetic rubber after l5 years of govern¬
ment participation and protection took over the dominant position of natural
rubber in this country. Rubber consumption continuously rose because of
increased automotive production and as a result of the ever-expanding appli¬
cations of rubber which is the major result of the keen competition between
synthetic rubber and natural. The price of natural rubber in the early
postwar years and in recent years was relatively stable, because the stable
price of synthetic rubber had irorked as a price stabilizer. The exporta¬
tion of American synthetic rubber increased sharply in the last previous
two years. This shows the increasing Importance of synthetic rubber in
the world market.
More natural rubber could be available for the rest of the world since
the end of World War Second because the rubber demand of the United States,
the dominant buyer of rubber in prewar years, is being fulfilled largely by
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the American-inade synthetic rubber. In facing an increasing world demand
for rubber, synthetic rubber has a very good chance to expand its produc¬
tion capacity to meet the deficit of demand in the world market which na¬
tural rubber has failed to supply.
BIBLIOGElAPHr
Books
Adams, Walter, and Gray, Horace M, Monopoly in America{ The Government
as Promoter. New York: The Macmillan Company, 19
« The Structure of American Industry.
New York: The Macmillan Company, 19^0.
Alderfer, E, B,, and Mlchl, K, E, Economics of American Industry. 3rd
ed« New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co,, Inc,, 1957*
Allen, Edward L, Economics of American Manufacturing, New York: Henry
Holt and Co., 19^2.
Barnes, James A, Wealth of the American People. New York: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 19U9.
Bauer, Peter T, The Rubber Industi*y: A Study In Competition and Monopoly.
Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 19Uo,
Bini.ng, Arthur C, The Rise of American Economic Life. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 19U3»
Bras, Jean Le, Rubber: Fundamentals of its Science and Technology, trans,
Berch, Irene, ' New York: Chemical Publishing Co., Inc., 19^7.
GLover, John G,, and Cornell, William, The Development of American Indus¬
tries. 3rd ed. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19^1•
HaJJ., Courtney R. History of American Industrial Science. Mew York:
Library Publishers, 195U.
Howard, Frank A, Buna Rubber: The Birth of An Industry. New York: D, van
Nostrand Co., Irtc., 19U7.
Knorr, Klaus E. Rubber After the War. Stanford,.Calif,; Stanford Uni¬
versity Press, 19hh» ”
. World Rubber and Its Regulation. Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 19U^.
Lief, Alfred, The Firestone Story. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-
Hill Book Co,, Inc., 1951«
Mason, Edward S, Economic Concentration and the Monopoly Problem.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957.
Popple, Charles S, Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) in World War II.
New York: Standard Oil Company (N, J.), 19^2,
75
Po-ffers, Paul 0, Synthetic Resins and Rubbers. New York: John Wilejr &
Sons, Inc., 19h3«
Shannon, Fred A, Americans Conomic Growth. 3rd ed. New York: The Ifec-
millan Co., 1951.
Stocking, George ¥., and Watkins, Ifyron W. Cartels in Action. New York:
The T-vrentieth Century Fund, 19l|-6.
.. Cartels or Competition? New
York: Twentieth Century i^und, 19U8.
Thompson, Virginia. Postmortem On Malaya. New York: The Macmillan Co..
19U3.
Vance, Stanley. American Industries. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc,,
1955.
Walton, Francis, Miracle of World War II, New York: The Macmillan Co,,
1956.
Welsh, C, A. The Development of the Organic Chemical Industry. New York:
New York University Press, 19li7.
Miscellaneous Ifeterial,
The Chemical Industry: Facts Book. 2nd ed. Washington: Manufacturing
Chemists* Association, Inc., 1955.
Congressional Record. Washington: Government Printing Office,
The Economic Almanac for 19U5-U6. New York: The Conference Board, National
Industrial Conference Board, 19U5,
Facts on File.
Federal Registrar.
Harry Jiler (ed,). Commodity Year Book. New York: Commodity Research
Bureau, from 19i;B to 1957.
Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington: U, S, Department
of Commerce, from 1939 to 1956,
Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations, from 19U8 to 1956.
Articles
’•Control of Rubber in World War 11," Southern Economic Journal, XIII
(January, 19i<-7)j pp» 203ff.
76
"Industrial Strength for Defense," The New York Tiroes, June 11, 19h5»
Peter T, Bauer, "Rubber and Foreign Exchange," Economic Journal, L
(June, I9U0), 23I-I4I*
"Reversal in Rubber," Fortune> XXXIII (March, 19li6), p. 85.
"Rubber Producing Disposal Commission Disbands," Rubber World, Vol»
CXXXVI, No. 5 (September, 1956).
"Rubber Program," Business Week. March 23, 19U6, p. 28f.
"Trouble in Synthetic Rubber," Fortune, Vol. XXXV (June, 19U7), p. 166.
"U. S. as Boss of World Rubber: Future of Synthetic Elants," U, S, News
and World Report. January 11, 19U6, p. Ui;ff.
"U, S, Policy on Synthetic Rubber Critized," Rubber World, Vol, CXXIX,
No. 1 (October, 1953), pp. 113ff.
Government Publications^
Committee on Banking and Currency, Disposal of Rubber Plants; Senate
Reports No. 579 , 83d Cong., 1st' SWs,, 1953, p. 32ff,
Inter-Agency Policy Committee on Rubber. First and Second Reports.
July 22, 19U6.
President of U. S, Message to Congress; February 10, 19U7i January lli.,
1952j April 13, 1953.
Reconstruction finance Corporation. Report to Congress on %nthetic
Operations. June 30, 1951|.
. Report on Rubber Program, 19UO-h5.
February 2lj., 19l|.5 and April 8, 19U6,
. Program for Disposal to Private of
(ioverment-Ovfned Kubber-Prod''ucing Facilities, March 1, 1953.
Rubber Survey Committee. Report. Washington, 19li2,
Rubber Producing Facilities Commission, Report to Congress. 1955. (Jan¬
uary and June.)
Secretary of Commerce. Rubber: First to Seventh Annual Report. From
1919 to 1956.
L 1
All materials from Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C
77
Tariff Commission. War Chansces in Industry. Sarins Report No. 6.:
Rubber. September, 19Uit.. . .. f ... , _
